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I. INTRODUCTION
Once viewed as the "third rail" of politics,' Social Security2 appears to be
moving inexorably toward reform.3 In his 1998 State of the Union address,
President Clinton proclaimed strengthening Social Security a high priority4 and
called for bipartisan forums on Social Security reform to be held throughout the
United States.- Similarly, following the 1998 November elections, congressional
leaders expressed commitment to "saving Social Security, 6 and House Ways

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky, College of Law. A.B. 1983,
University of Michigan; J.D. 1988, Cornell Law School.
The Author is grateful to Richard C. Ausness, Karen C. Burke, Michael P. Healy,
Brian A. Jones, Robert J. Myers, and John M. Rogers for their comments on earlier drafts
and to Lisa Graening, Carol Paris, Amy Shoemaker, and Jeffrey Wilder for their research
assistance.
1. See Gregg Says He Opposes Creationof Panelto Address Social Security, 25
PENS. & BEN. REP. (BNA) 805, 806 (1998) ("Social Security has often been referred to
as 'the third rail' of politics, but the political climate has changed."); Social
Security--Retirees Can'tLive Without It, It Can'tSurvive Without Reform, 13 BEN. Q.
8, 8 (1997) (stating that "Social Security has come to be known as the 'third rail' of
politics" because it is the dominant source of income for the retired population).
2. For purposes of this Article, the term Social Security will be used in its generally
accepted manner as referring only to the cash benefits provided by the Old-Age,
Survivors, and Disability Insurance ("OASDI") program. The Old-Age and Survivors
Insurance ("OASr) program provides benefits for retired workers and their spouses and
children and to survivors of deceased workers. The Disability Insurance ("DI") program
provides benefits for disabled workers and their spouses and children and pays for
rehabilitation services for the disabled. See Martynas A. Ycas, The Issue Unresolved:
Innovatingand AdaptingDisabilityProgramsfor the Third Era of Social Security, 58
Soc. SEC. BULL. 48,49 (1995).
3. See Sylvester J. Schieber, A Framework and Proposalfor Social Security
Reform, 22 WASH. Q. 157, 157 (1999) (declaring that "Social Security reform is a
certainty").
For a discussion of the reasons underlying the need for reform, see Kathryn L.
Moore, Redistribution Under the Current Social Security System, 61 U. Pirr. L. REv.
(forthcoming 2000) and authorities cited therein.
4. President William Clinton, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on
the State of the Union, WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, Feb. 2,
1998, at 129; Global Executives Give High Rankings to SocialSecurity PrivateAccount
Approach, 25 PENS. & BEN. REP. (BNA) 806, 806 (1998).
5. Firstof Social Security ForumsScheduledfor April 7 in Kansas City, Mo., 25
PENS. & BEN. REP. (BNA) 803, 803 (1998).
6. See, e.g., 1999 CouldBe Year ofAction on Retirement Security Issues, Sources
Say, 26 PENS. & BEN. REP. (BNA) 69, 70 (1999).
In a Jan. 6 speech to House members, House Speaker Dennis Hasteret (R-Ill.),
said retirement and health security are among the top challenges the country
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss2/1
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and Means Chairman Bill Archer renewed his commitment to bipartisan reform
of Social Security as recently as December 8, 1999 in a letter to President
Clinton.7 Congressional hearings on reform proposals are ubiquitous,' and
discussions
regarding Social Security and its possible reform flood the popular
9
press.

While reform proposals vary,'0 proposals to privatize the system partially;
that is, to provide some, but not all, benefits through pre-funded individual
accounts, are among the most popular of the reform proposals." Often differing
faces in 1999. 'We must make sure that Social Security is there for those who
depend upon it and those who expect to. We must consider options for
younger workers so they can look forward to an even brighter retirement,'
said Hastert.
Id.; see also GOP Leaders Pledge to 'Save' System; Republican Members Invited to
Conference, 25 PENS. & BEN. REP. (BNA) 2836, 2836 (1998) ("Senate Majority Leader

Trent Lott (R-Miss.) and House Speaker-elect Bob Livingston (R-La.) Dec. 3 said
'saving Social Security' is part oftheir common agenda for the 106th Congress."); Social
Security, tax cuts top GOPleaders' '99 agenda, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Dec. 4,
1998, at A9 ("Congress will focus next year on buttressing Social Security, cutting taxes
and improving schools, the two Republicans who will lead the House and Senate said
yesterday.").
7. See Rep. Archer Urges Administration To Take Action on Shoring up System,
26 PENS. & BEN. REP. (BNA) 2885, 2885 (1999).

8. For example, the House Ways and Means Committee scheduled a hearing

focusing on Social Security reform proposals for January 21, 1999, while the Senate
Budget Committee planned a series of hearings on "Social Security in the 21st Century"
in 1999. See ArcherAnnounces Jan.21 Hearing;Kennelly, Kemp, Jackson to Speak, 26
PENS. & BEN. REP. (BNA) 147 (1999). The House Ways and Means Committee again
scheduled hearings on Social Security for June 9-10, 1999; Archer Schedules June 9-10
Hearings;Apfel Says Reform DifficultBut Not Dead,26 PENS. & BEN. REP. (BNA) 1459,
1459 (1999).
9. See, e.g., An American Discusses Social Security: One of a Series of Views,
NEWSWEEK, Apr. 27, 1999, at 66-67; Ellen Goodman, Seniors Will Have To Keep
Working-IfAnyone WillLet Them, LEXINGTONHERALD-LEADER, May 26, 1998, at A11;
Ron Hutcheson, Plans To Link SocialSecurity, Markets GainingPopularity,LEXINGTON
HERALD-LEADER, Apr. 23, 1998, at A13; Jane Bryant Quinn, Reforms Will Change
retirementplanning,LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, May 31, 1998, at El; David Segal,
At the Cato Institute, An Idea Catches On; Think Tank Is Thrust Into Social Security
Debate, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 1999, at El; Should Social Security Be Privatized?: Two
Congressmen Debate the Issue, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, June 1, 1998, at A9;
Michael M. Weinstein, A Wrong Turn on the Road to Social Security Reform, N.Y.
TIMES, May 6, 1999, at C2.
10. For a comparison of the details of a wide range of reform proposals, see Kelly
Olsen, Appendix: A Point-by-PointComparison of Social Security Reform Plans, 13
BEN. Q. 88 (1997).
11. See Smith Bill Would Start Pilot Program of PersonalAccounts for Young
Workers, PENS. & BEN. DAILY (BNA), Apr. 11, 1998, at d5. The article stated:
As discussion of Social Security reform gains a higher profile in the wake of
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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in detail," the partial privatization proposals typically share a number of
common elements. First, like the current system, 3 most partial privatization
proposals require that workers contribute some portion of their earnings to
finance their Social Security benefits. Most partial privatization proposals then
require that some portion of these contributions be used to fund individual
accounts, and that workers invest those individual accounts in one or more
private funds. Finally, most proposals provide workers with two tiers of
benefits. The first tier benefit may consist of a flat benefit that all workers
receive regardless of their earnings or, like the current system, the first tier
benefit may be based in part on earnings, but provide a greater return on lower
wages than on higher wages. The second tier benefit consists of the
contributions to the individual account and any earnings or losses thereon.
This Article explains why partial privatization would likely have a
disproportionately adverse effect on the benefits of three specific subpopulations:
women, minorities, and lower-income workers. The Article focuses on these
three groups principally because they are at a heightened risk of poverty in old
age.' 4 Since one ofthe fundamental purposes of Social Security is to provide for
progressive redistribution to lift the elderly out of poverty, 5 policymakers should
be (and are)' 6 concerned with how Social Security reform would likely affect

President Clinton's 'save Social Security first' message in his State of the
Union address, the notion of creating individual, privately invested retirement
accounts is consuming a substantial amount of the debate. In a January
speech, House Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-Ga) urged personal retirement
accounts. Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY), the ranking Finance
Committee democrat, introduced a Social Security reform bill (S. 1792) to
provide for voluntary personal retirement accounts. In addition, Senate
Finance Committee Chairman William V. Roth (R-Del) and House Budget
Committee Chairman John Kasich (R-Ohio) have called for future budget
surpluses to be divided among 'Social Security plus accounts' for American
workers.
Id. (citations omitted); see also PublicIs Interestedin PrivateAccounts, But Concerned
About Logistics, PhillipsSays, 25 PENs. & BEN. REP. (BNA) 1161, 1161 (1998) (noting
that private accounts were discussed more than any other topic at the Kansas City forum
on Social Security); Retirees Can'tLive Without It, supra note 1, at 13.
12. See, e.g., Kathryn L. Moore, Privatization of Social Security: Misguided
Reform, 71 TEMP. L. Rnv. 131, 151-53 (1998) (describing differences between Advisory
Council's IA and PSA plans).
13. This Article assumes that the reader has a basic understanding of how the
current system operates. For those who would like more details, see Moore, supra note

3, app., and authorities cited therein for an overview of the funding and benefit structure
of the current system.
14. See Moore, supra note 3, § II.
15. See Kathryn L. Moore, Redistribution Under a PartiallyPrivatized Social
Security System, 64 BROOK. L.'REv. 969, 970 n.5, 988 & n.80 (1998).

16. For expressions of such interest, see Moore, supra note 3, introduction.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss2/1
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these subpopulations.' 7 Of course, not all women and minorities are at
heightened risk of poverty in old age.' s To the extent that members of these
groups are not at a heightened risk of poverty in old age, public policy may not
dictate that Social Security reform accord them any special protection.
Nevertheless, policymakers should still be aware of any disparate impact Social
Security reform may have on these groups. 9 Accordingly, this Article analyzes

17. Social Security's redistributive goal is not without its critics. See, e.g., supra
note 15, at 970 n.8. Yet even critics of the current system point to the effect on the atrisk populations in promoting their reform proposals. See, e.g., WILLLM W. BEACH &
GARETH G. DAVIS, SOCIAL SECURITY'S RATE OF RETURN (Heritage Ctr. for Data Analysis
Rep. No. 98-01, 1998) [hereinafter RATE OF RETURN]; WILLIAM W. BEACH & GARETH
G. DAvIS, SOCIAL SECURITY'S RATE OF RETURN FOR HISPANIC AMERICANS (Heritage Ctr.
for Data Analysis Rep. No. 98-02, 1998); CARRIE Lips, THE WORKING POOR AND SOCIAL
SECURITY PRIVATIZATION (CATO Inst. Briefing Paper No. 40, 1998); DARCY ANN
OLSEN, GREATER FINANCIAL SECURITY FOR WOMEN WITH PERSONAL RETIREMENT

ACCOUNTS (CATO Inst. Briefing Paper No. 38, 1998); EKATERINA SHIRLEY & PETER
SPIEGLER, THE BENEFITS OF SOCIAL SECURITY PRIVATIZATION FOR WOMEN (CATO
Project on Soc. Sec. Privatization No. 12, 1998); MICHAELTANNER, PRIVATIZlNG SOCIAL
SECURITY: A BIG BOOST FOR THE POOR (CATO Project on Soc. Sec. Privatization No.

4, 1996). For critiques of the Heritage reports, see Dorothy A. Brown et al., Social
SecurityReform: Risks, Returns, and Race, CORNELL J.L. &PUB. POL'Y (forthcoming);
Kilolo Kijakazi, African Americans, HispanicAmericans, and Social Security: The

Shortcomingsof the HeritageFoundationReports, in CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY
PRIORITIES (1998), availablein <http://www.cbpp.org/10-5-98socsee.html>.

18. In fact, Asian/Pacific Islanders have the highest median income of any
racial/ethnic group in the United States. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, MONEY
INCOME FOR THE UNITED STATES:

1997 CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, CONSUMER

INCOME P60-200 vii tbl.A (showing that median income in 1997 was $45,249 for

Asian/Pacific Islanders, $40,577 for whites not of Hispanic origin, $26,628 for
Hispanics, and $25,050 for blacks).
19. Cf Dorothy A. Brown et al., supranote 17 (stating that "no serious [Social
Security] reform proposal can any longer ignore the issue of racial equity in the debate
over social security"); Erik Jensen, CriticalTheory and the Loneliness of the Tax Prof,
76 N.C. L. REv. 1753, 1756-57 (1998) ("If a critic can demonstrate that the Internal
Revenue Code has had unfortunate effects on particular groups (call this 'mild' feminism
or 'mild' critical race theory), we certainly ought to know that."); Marjorie E.
Komhauser, Through the Looking Glass With Alice and Larry: The Nature of
Scholarship, 76 N.C. L. REv. 1609, 1615-16 n.27 (1998) ("Even if the tax system were
neutral on balance, there is still merit in examining individual provisions to see their
effects on different segments of the population."); William C. Whitford, Remarkable, 76
N.C. L. REV. 1639, 1644 (1998) (contending that "race concerns should always be
considered in the policy mix" even if they do not always trump other policy concerns).
But see Lawrence Zelenak, Taking CriticalTax Theory Seriously, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1520,
1524 (1998) (questioning value of merely examining provisions of Tax Code for racial
effect: "It is unfair to criticize current law for its effects on women or blacks without
showing a way to do better; more important, mere critique without a workable solution
does nothing to better anyone's situation").
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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how partial privatization would likely affect the benefits of all three
subpopulations, regardless of whether they face a heightened risk of poverty in
old age. For ease ofreference, this Article will refer to the three subpopulations
as "at-risk" or "more vulnerable" even though individual. members of the groups
may not face a higher risk of poverty.
The Article begins by explaining how partial privatization differs
fundamentally from the current system. The Article then explains why partial
privatization would likely have an adverse effect on the benefits of women,
minorities, and lower-income workers. Specifically, it explains why shifting
investment risk to workers, the fundamental indispensable difference between
the current system and a partially privatized system, would likely have an
adverse impact on the benefits of the three at-risk groups. It then explains how
distribution of benefits to the three subpopulations would be impacted by partial
privatization's interaction with the four factors-(1) payout of benefits, (2)
progressive benefit formula, (3) disability benefits, and (4) auxiliary
benefits 2 -- most relevant in determining how the current system redistributes
income. The Article does not analyze any single partial privatization proposal,

although it does refer to specific proposals when relevant.
II. How PARTIAL PRIVATIZATION DIFFERS FROM THE CURRENT
SYSTEM
Recently, a number of groups and individuals have proposed partial
privatization of Social Security as a solution, or partial solution, to the program's
long-term funding problems. For example, seven of the thirteen members of the
1994-1996 Social Security Advisory Council 2' ("Advisory Council") have
proposed that Social Security be partially privatized. 22 Similarly, the Committee
for Economic Developmene 3 and the National Commission on Retirement

20. See Moore, supra note 3 (discussing how these four factors affect redistribution
within the current Social Security system).
21. In recent years, an Advisory Council on Social Security was appointed every

four years by the Secretary of Health and Human Services to review the status of all of
the Social Security trust funds in relation to the long-term commitments of the Social
Security programs. See I U.S. ADVISORY COUNCIL

ON SOCIAL SECURITY, REPORT OF THE
1994-1996 ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY 2 (1997) [hereinafter ADVISORY

COUNCIL REPORT]. For a description of the Advisory Council partial privatization
proposals, see id. at 28-33.
22. Id.
23. See FIXING SOCIAL SECURITY: A STATEMENT BY THE RESEARCH AND POLICY
COMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1997), available in
http://www.ced.org>.
The Committee for Economic Development [CED] is an independent research
and policy organization of some 250 business leaders and educators. CED is
nonprofit, nonpartisan, and nonpolitical. Its purpose is to propose policies

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss2/1
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Policy24 have offered partial privatization proposals. In addition, members of
Congress25have repeatedly introduced bills that would partially privatize Social
Security.

The partial privatization proposals differ from the current system in two
fundamental ways. First, partial privatization shifts investment risk from the
federal government to individual workers. Second, partial privatization involves
the pre-funding of benefits. Only the first of these two differences, however, is
26
a necessary prerequisite to partial privatization.
A. Investment Risk
There are two basic types of retirement plans: defined benefit plans and
defined contribution plans. A defined benefit plan is one in which the benefit is
expressed as a certain amount to be paid at the participant's retirement.
Typically, such plans provide for a fixed amount per month to be paid for the life
of the retired participant and spouse. The fixed amount is generally based on a

that bring about steady economic growth at high employment and reasonably

stable prices, increased productivity and living standards, greater and more
equal opportunity for every citizen, and an improved quality of life for all.
Id. For a description of the CED's partial privatization proposal, see id. at 2-3, 49-51.
24. The National Commission on Retirement Policy ("NCRP") is a bipartisan panel
consisting of lawmakers, economists, and private sector experts. Panel Proposes
PersonalAccounts, Raising Retirement Eligibility Age, 25 PENS. & BEN. REP. (BNA)
1203, 1203 (1998). It is an initiative of the Center for Strategic and International Studies,
a public policy research institution located in Washington, D.C. See NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON RETIREMENT POLICY, CAN AMERICA AFFORD TO RETIRE?

THE

RETIREMENT SECURITY CHALLENGE FACING You (1998). For more information on the
NCRP, see The National Commission on Retirement Policy (visited Feb. 25, 2000)

<http://www.csis.org/retire/>.

For a description of the NCRP partial privatization

proposal, see NATIONAL COMMISSION ON RETIREMENT POLICY, THE 21ST CENTURY
RETIREMENT SECURITY PLAN (1998) [hereinafter THE 21ST CENTURY RETIREMENT
SECURITY PLAN].

25. See, e.g., S. 1383, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 1793, 106th Cong. (1999); S.
2369, 105th Cong. (1998); S. 1792, 105th Cong. (1998); H.R. 3560, 105th Cong. (1998);
H.R. 3456, 105th Cong. (1998); S. 321, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 3082, 105th Cong.
(1997); H.R. 2929, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 2782, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 2768,
105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 1611, 105th Cong. (1997).
26. Some analysts view proposals that involve the federal government investing
in the private market and bearing the risk as privatization proposals. See, e.g, Proposals
for Alternative Investment ofthe Social Security Trust FundReserves: HearingBefore
the Subcomm. on Social Security ofthe House Comm. on Ways and Means, 103d Cong.
111 (1994) (treating proposals in which federal government invests in private market as
privatization proposals); Bob Davis, A Consensus Emerges, WALL ST. J. EUR., July 10,
1996, at 1 (same). As discussed at the beginning of this Article, however, this Article
only treats proposals that provide all or part of benefits through pre-funded individual
accounts as privatization proposals.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000

7

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 2 [2000], Art. 1

MISSOURILA WREVIEW

[Vol. 65

formula that takes into account the participant's years of service and salary. Plan
assets are pooled together to meet the demands of all of the participants, and the
plan sponsor bears the investment risk."
Defined contribution plans, unlike defined benefit plans, do not promise
participants a certain benefit upon retirement. Instead, benefits under a defined
contribution plan are based on contributions to the plan and any earnings or
losses on those contributions. Typically, the employer contributes a fixed
amount to each individual account established on behalf of each participant, and
the account is credited with any earnings or losses on those contributions. Upon
retirement, the participant is entitled to a benefit based upon the amount held in
the account rather than a fixed benefit based on the participant's years of service
and compensation. Thus, unlike a participant in a defined benefit plan, the
participant in a defined contribution plan bears the investment risk.28
The current Social Security system promises participants a specific benefit
based on a complex formula. 29 Because the current system promises a specific
benefit, it is a defined benefit retirement program. 3' As such, the plan sponsor,
or government, bears the investment risk. In contrast, the partial privatization
proposals add a second-tier, defined contribution, element to the current system.
The partial privatization proposals do not promise workers a specific benefit
from their second tier; instead, the second tier benefit consists of workers'
contributions to their individual accounts and any earnings or losses thereon.
Accordingly, the partial privatization proposals differ fundamentally from the
current system because they subject workers to investment risk.
B. Pre-funding ofBenefits
Unlike the current Social Security system, which is funded principally on
a pay-as-you-go basis,3 all of the partial privatization proposals currently under
serious consideration require that the second tier benefit be funded in advance.32

27. See Moore, supra note 12, at 137 n.42.

28. See Moore, supra note 12, at 137 n.42.
29. See 42 U.S.C. § 415 (1994). For a more detailed discussion of how these
benefits are calculated, see Moore, supra note 4, app.
30.

Cf A FRAMEwORK

FOR ANALYZING AND COMPARING SOCIAL SECURITY

POLICIES 6 (EBRI Issue Brief No. 183, 1997) [hereinafter ISSUE BRIEF No. 183] ("In a
defined benefit plan, such as the current Social Security system, the goal is to guarantee
that, if workers participate, they receive benefits in an amount dictated by a
predetermined formula.").
31. For a more detailed discussion of the way in which the current system is
funded, see Moore, supra note 3, app.
32. Partial privatization does not require pre-funding of benefits. For example,
Latvia recently established a privatized but unfunded pension system in which payroll
taxes are collected by the government and credited to workers' "notional" accounts with
paper returns on contributions. Similarly, the United States could create a privatized
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss2/1
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In fact, the principal justification for the partial privatization proposals derives
from the potential advantages of a pre-funded system.33
Because the current system is financed principally on a pay-as-you-go basis,
the system is limited in the rates of return it can provide participants. If
population and tax rates remain constant over time, a mature pay-as-you-go
system, like the current Social Security system, can only provide retirees with
an average return on contributions that is equal to the growth in real wages.3
Since the growth in real wages is projected to be about one percent each year for
the foreseeable future and the working population is projected to shrink relative
to the beneficiary population, the current system faces the specter of providing
future retirees with an average return of less than one percent.35
A pre-funded system, in contrast, offers the potential of higher rates of
return.3 6 Over the last one hundred years, average long-term rates of return on
equities have been about seven percent per year.37 If Social Security

Social Security system without pre-funding. See John Geanakoplos et al., Would a
PrivatizedSocial Security System ReallyPay a HigherRate ofReturn?, in FRAMING THE
SOCIAL SECURITY DEBATE 137, 141 (R. Douglas Arnold et al. eds., 1998). In fact,

however, all of the partial privatization proposals provide for pre-funding of the second
tier individual account benefit.
33. Proponents may offer additional justifications for partial privatization. For
example, Representative John Porter claimed that his proposal to partially privatize
Social Security on a temporary basis would (1)unmask the federal government's general
budget deficit, (2) increase the national savings rate and American competitiveness, and
(3) provide "individuals an opportunity to improve their overall retirement income by
earning a higher return on their contributions in the private sector than under Social
Security." U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY: ANALYSIS OF A
PROPOSAL TO PRIVATIZE TRUST FUND RESERVES 1 (1990) [hereinafter PROPOSAL TO
PRIVATIZE]. For a discussion of the effect of a funded system on national savings and
the unmasking of the federal deficit, see, e.g., Barry P. Bosworth, FundAccumulation:
How Much? How Managed, in SOCIAL SECURITY: WHAT ROLE FOR THE FUTURE 89

(Peter A. Diamond et al. eds., 1996); PromotingNational Saving Through Social
Security Trust Funds, in SOCIAL SECURITY'S LOOMING SURPLUSES: PROSPECTS AND
IMPLICATIONS 17-38 (Carolyn L. Weaver ed., 1990). For additional discussion on the
advantages of advance funding, see U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SOCIAL
SECURITY: DIFFERENT APPROACHES FOR ADDRESSING PROGRAM SOLVENCY GAO/HEHS-

98-33, 29 (1998) [hereinafter DIFFERENT APPROACHES]. See also John B. Williamson,
A Critique of the Casefor PrivatizingSocial Security, 37 GERONTOLOGIST 561 (1997)

(describing and responding to 10 arguments provided in support of privatization).
34. See Moore, supra note 15, at 975-76.
35. See Moore, supranote 15, at 975-76.
36. But see
SECURITY:

JOHN MUELLER, WINNERS AND LOSERS FROM PRIVATIZING SOCIAL
A REPORT COMMISSIONED BY THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO PRESERVE

MEDICARE 4 n.5 (1999) (noting that privatizers ignore the other half of "[Paul]
Samuelson's conclusion: That the long-run rate of return on pay-as-you-go Social
Security would be higher than the yield on financial assets of similarly low risks").

37. Narayana R. Kocherlakota, The Equity Premium: It's Still a Puzzle, 34 J.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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contributions were invested in the private equities market, the system would
have the potential of reaping these higher rates of return.38 Proponents of partial
privatization contend that partial privatization would benefit all workers, no
matter their income level, by permitting them to invest in the equities market and
thus reap these higher returns.39

ECON. LITERATURE 42, 42 (1996). The average annual real return on stocks from 1926
to 1996 was 9.4%. See Geanakoplos et al., supra note 32, at 142.

38. Some analysts object to comparing the current system's rates of return with
those of equities. See, e.g., DEAN BAKER, PRIVATIZING SOCIAL SECURITY: THE WALL
STREET Fix (Economic Policy Institute Brief No. 112, 1996) (contending that "relevant
measure is not the rate of return provided by Social Security benefits relative to the taxes
paid in, but rather the improvements in living standards over generations"); Geanakoplos
et al., supra note 32, at 12-23 (contending that such comparisons are not appropriate
because they fail to take into account transition costs and differences in investment risk).
Other analysts note that there is some risk that investing Social Security funds in the
private market could lower the return on equities. See, e.g., IssUE BRIEF No. 183, supra
note 30, at 15 (stating that "given a reallocation of the Social Security assets, the
assumption that equity returns would remain at their current levels is not one to be taken
without careful thought about market interactions"). Others note that the retirement of
the baby boom generation could depress the rate of return on equities. See SYLVESTER
J. SCHIEBER & JOHN B. SHOVEN, THE AGING OF THE BABYBOOM GENERATION 18-20
(1996) (noting that the retirement of baby boomers could cause the rate of return on
equities to fall by roughly 5% per year between 2010 and 2030 but contending that
presence ofglobal capital market, rational expectations, and the fact that corporate assets
are cash-generating depreciable property is likely to alleviate at least some of that
decrease).

39. See, e.g., I ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supranote 21, at 36-49 (comparing
rates of return under the three Advisory Council proposals); FIXING SOCIAL SECURITY,
supranote 24, at 44 (recognizing that not everyone is likely to receive higher returns on
their contributions but contending that investments in the private sector are likely to
improve the "money's worth" of contributions made by the majority of younger
workers); THE 21ST CENTURY RETIREMENT SECURITY PLAN, supra note 24, at 3 ("The

Commission is persuaded that most Americans will receive more retirement income from
the Social Security program if individual savings accounts are incorporated into the
system than they would receive if traditional solutions alone were used to bring the
system back into balance."); Sylvester J. Schieber, The Needfor Social Security Reform
andthe Implications ofFundingThroughPersonalSecurityAccounts, 13 BEN. Q. 29, 38
(1997). Schieber states:
According to the projections developed by the Social Security actuaries for
the Advisory Council, the PSA proposal offers the potential for both lowwage and high-wage workers to become better off under a proposal of this
sort than under the extremely low rates of return provided under the current
system as a result of the funding of benefits that is an important element of the
proposal.
Id.; see also Steve Forbes, How to Replace Social Security, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 1996,
at A20 ("[T]he average worker retiring today receives a lifetime return of only about
2.2% on the taxes he has paid into the system.... Contrast this with the historic 9% to
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss2/1
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The current system need not be partially privatized; that is, individual
accounts need not be added to the system to provide for advance funding of the
system." Indeed, the Social Security system originally provided for the creation
of a substantial reserve. 41 Moreover, the current system need not be partially
privatized to provide for investment in the private securities market. The system
is currently running a surplus and that surplus could be invested in the private
securities market.4' In fact, six members of the Advisory Council recommended
that the possibility of investing a significant portion of the Social Security trust
fund in the equities market be studied,43 and President Clinton proposed in his
1999 State of the Union address that part of the current Social Security surplus
be invested in private securities."

10% annual returns from stock market investments.... The advantages of an IRA-type
approach are overpowering."); BEACH & DAVIS, RATE OF RETURN, supra note 17, at 6-9
(contending that Social Security rate of return for most Americans will be vastly inferior
to what they could expect from placing their payroll taxes in even the most conservative
private investments); Lips, supra note 17, at 1 (contending that poor would benefit most
from privatization).
40. See Geanakoplos et al., supra note 32, 139-41 (noting that "[i]t is also possible
to raise system funding without involving individual accounts; taxes could be raised or
benefits cut and the proceeds could be put into a central trust fund").
41. See CHARLES M. BRAIN, SOCIAL SECURITY AT THE CROSSROADS 56 (1991); J.
DOUGLAS BROWN, AN AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SECURITY: EVOLUTION AND

ISSUES 179 (1972).
42. Current law, however, would have to be amended to permit investment in the
private equities market. See 42 U.S.C. § 401(d) (1994) (limiting investment of the trust
fund to interest bearing obligations of the United States or obligations guaranteed as to
both principal and interest by the United States).
For analyses of the wisdom of investing the Social Security trust fund in the private
equities market, see, e.g., U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY
FINANCING: IMPLICATIONS OF GOVERNMENT STOCK INVESTING FOR THE TRUST FUND, THE

FEDERAL BUDGET, AND THE ECONOMY GAO/AIMD/HEHS-98-74 (1998); Theodore J.

Angelis, Investing Public Money in Private Markets: What Are the Right Questions?,
in FRAMING THE SOCIAL SECURITY DEBATE: VALUES, POLITICS, AND ECONOMICS 287 (R.
Douglas Arnold et al. eds., 1998); Gary Burtless, Investment Policyfor the Social
Security Trust Funds, in SOCIAL SECURITY AND ECONOMIC WELL-BEING ACROSS
GENERATIONS 89, 96-98 (John R. Gist ed., 1988); MICHAEL LEIDY, INVESTING U.S.
SOCIAL SECURITY TRUST FUND ASSETS IN PRIVATE SECURITIES (IMF Working Paper 97-

112, 1997); Gene Steuerle, In vesting Social Security Surpluses in the Stock Market, 66
TAX NOTES TODAY 1867 (1995); 67 TAX NOTES TODAY 129 (1995); 67 TAX NOTES
TODAY 287 (1995) (a three part series).
43. I ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 21, at 25.

44. See At the CatoInstitute,An Idea Catches On: Think Tank Thrust Into Debate
on Social Security, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 1999, at El ("In Clinton's State of the Union
address, he called on Congress to earmark a hefty chunk of projected budget surpluses
for Social Security and channel at least $650 billion of the money into stocks over the
Published
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1Il. EFFECT OF PARTIAL PRIVATIZATION ON AT-RISK BENEFICIARIES
Determining how partial privatization of Social Security would likely affect
the benefits of any particular worker or group of workers is not easy. The
current system is extraordinarily complex and determining rates of return under
the current system or any amendment to that system "involves many judgments
'
and is not easily answered with general aggregate numbers."45
This Article does not attempt to develop a mathematical model to generate
an aggregate number to determine how partial privatization would likely affect
the benefits of the at-risk groups. 46 Instead, the Article analyzes five separate
facets of a partially privatized system to explain why it would likely have an
adverse impact on the benefits of the at-risk groups.
It first addresses partial privatization's shift of investment risk to workers,
the fundamental indispensable difference between the current system and a
partially privatized system. It then analyzes partial privatization's interaction
with the four elements of the current system that are most relevant in
determining how it redistributes income. Those elements are: (1) payout of
benefits, (2) progressive benefit formula, (3) disability benefits, and (4) auxiliary
benefits.4 7

reintroduced the idea in his 2001 budget. Cf Clinton Fiscal2001 Budget PlanIncludes
Equity Investment of Social Security Assets, 27 PENS. & BEN. REP. (BNA) 466, 466
(2000) ("The Clinton administration's fiscal 2001 budget proposal, transmitted to
Congress Feb. 7, revisits the idea of investing Social Security Trust assets in equities, a
proposal the administration dropped last year after it proved too controversial to gamer
bipartisan support.").
45. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 105TH CONG., 1998 GREEN
BOOK 86 (Comm. Print 1998).
46. For a discussion of a computer model that was developed for this purpose, see
KELLY A. OLSEN ET AL., How Do INDIVIDUAL SOCIAL SECURITY ACCOUNTS STACK UP?
AN EVALUATION USING THE EBRI-SSASIM2 POLICY SIMULATION ANALYSIS (EBRI Issue
Brief No. 195, 1998) (using model to show cost, benefit, national saving, and growth
projections under five options for reforming Social Security, including two that would
partially privatize system). See also CRAIG COPELAND ET AL., SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM
(EBRI Issue Brief No. 210, June 1999) (describing updated application of model);
MUELLER, supranote 37 (using the SSASIM model to find scaled back version of current
Social Security system almost always superior to privatized or partially privatized
system).
For criticisms of the model and its applications, see, e.g., CATO Institute Study
Rejects Finding ofPriorReport PanningPrivateAccounts, 26 PENS. &BEN. REP. (BNA)
2827, 2827 (1999) (describing criticisms of Mueller's study); Congressional Aides
Criticize EBRIAnalysis of Social Security Plans, 26 PENS. & BEN. REP. (BNA) 1645,
1645 (1999) (describing criticisms of EBRI Issue Brief No. 210).
47. Of course, other elements of the current system, such as the regressive manner
in which the benefits are financed (flat tax subject to a wage cap) and the limitation of 12
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss2/1
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A. Investment Risk
This section explains why women, minorities, and lower-income workers
are likely to be relatively disadvantaged by partial privatization's shift of
investment risk from the government to workers. With respect to women, the
section focuses on women in their roles as workers earning their own social
security benefits. 48 To the extent that women workers are married to higherwage white males and rely on them for investment advice and retirement
income, the analysis in this section may not apply to them.

may also affect its redistribution. See Moore, supra note 3, § III.
48. Cf Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, The Impact ofSocial Security
Reform on Women's Economic Security, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 375, 375 (1999)
(referring to "[w]omen as workers, wives, and widows"); see also infra Part llI(E)(1)
(discussing how partial privatization is likely to effect women in their capacity as wives
and widows relying on their husbands' earnings for their social security benefits).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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1. Investment Experience
Members of all three of the at-risk groups, women,49 minorities, 0 and
lower-income workers, 1 tend to save less for retirement than do higher-

49. For example, only 27% of women have over $100,000 in their 401(k) plans,
compared with 43% of men, while 33% of women have under $25,000 in their 401(k)
plans, compared with only 18% of men. See Juliette Fairley, Spinster Boomers Face
Rough Retirement, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Feb. 20, 1998, at B1 ("To make matters
worse, 27% of women have not made any financial plans for retirement.") (based on
study done by the National Center for Women and Retirement Research); see also
SHIRLEY & SPIEGLER, supra note 17 (according to a 1993 telephone survey by Merrill
Lynch Consulting only 30% of women between the ages of 25 and 65 were saving for
retirement compared with 47% of men of the same ages); Donna Gardner Schumell,
IncreasedFocus on Women as FinancialService Consumers, 135 TR. & EST. 19 (1996)

("A recent survey by Merrill Lynch reported that only 63 percent of women save for
retirement compared to 71 percent of men, and even then, save only half of what men

save.").
50. For example, only 29% of families headed by a nonwhite or Hispanic held
retirement accounts compared with 47% of families headed by a white non-Hispanic, and

smaller percentage of families headed by a nonwhite or I-Ispanic held every type of
financial asset, from transaction accounts to life insurance, than did families headed by
a white non-Hispanic. See Arthur B. Kennickell et al., Family Finances in the U.S.:
Recent Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances, FED. RESERVE BULL. 1, 9
(1997) (data based on 1995 Survey of Consumer Finances); see also Hearingon Pension
Issues: Before the Subcomm. on Oversight ofthe House Ways and Means Comm., 105th

Cong. (1998) (statement of Jeffrey R. Lewis, Exec. Dir., Heinz Family Philanthropies)
(according to poll by Heinz Foundation and SunAmerica Corporation of women aged 2555, "75% of African-American women and 59% of Hispanic women report that they
usually have little or no money left after paying their bills to save for retirement.");
MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW
PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 166 (1995) (showing that for every occupational
background, blacks have substantially lower net worth then their white counterparts);

Hispanic Group La Raza Urges More Involvement in the Reform Debate, 25 PENS. &
BEN. REP. (BNA) 2222,2223 (1998) (according to Employee Benefit Research Institute's
1998 Retirement Confidence Survey, Hispanics were least likely among all racial/ethnic
groups to have begun to save or invest for retirement); Humberto Cruz, HispanicsNeed
to Focus on FinancialPlanning,SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale), Nov. 21, 1997, at 23

("Among the top 10 percent of elderly Hispanics in terms of income, the average
household had liquid assets as low as $14,600 in 1995, compared with $172,500 for
whites, the most recent figures available.").
51. See, e.g., U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 401(K) PENSION PLANS: MANY
TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OPPORTUNITY TO ENSURE ADEQUATE RETIREMENT INCOME, GAO
REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMM. ON SOCIAL SECURITY, HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS

AND MEANS GAO/HEHS-96-176 5-6 & app. II, at 19, 22 & 23 (1996) [hereinafter
OPPORTUNITY] (finding that not only are higher-income workers far more likely to be
covered by a pension plan than lower-income workers but when covered by a 401(k)
plan, higher-income workers tend to contribute a larger percentage of their salary than
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss2/1
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income white males. As a result, members of the three at-risk groups have less
investment experience than do higher-income white males.52 Common sense

suggests that the relative lack of investment experience of the at-risk groups is

do lower-income workers) (based on data from 1992 Survey of Consumer Finances and
the Health and Retirement Survey); Kennickell et al., supra note 50, at 6 tbl.3 (finding
1995 median net worth of white families $84,700 compared with $6,800 for nonwhite
or Hispanic families); James M. Poterba et al., 401(k) Plansand Tax-DeferredSaving,
in STUDIES INTHE ECONOMICS OF AGING 105, 108 (David A. Wise ed., 1994) (using data
from 1984, 1985, and 1986 panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation
and May 1983 and 1988 Current Population Surveys and 1989 Survey of Consumer
Finances shows that participation in 401(k) plans and IRAs steadily increases with
income and that account balances also generally increase with income though not entirely
in lock step).
According to a survey released on April 5, 1998 by the Washington group,
Americans Discuss Social Security, people with annual incomes under $40,000,
particularly blacks and Hispanics, have difficulty saving for retirement. It found that
only 36% of people with incomes of less than $20,000 per year have started to save for
retirement, while 68% of people with annual incomes between $20,000 and $40,000 have
started to save. Eighty-two percent of those with annual incomes between $40,000 and
$60,000 have started saving, while 92% with annual incomes greater than $59,000 have
started to save for retirement. The survey further found that while most blacks and
Hispanics with at least $40,000 in annual income save for retirement to the same extent
as whites with similar incomes, as incomes decrease, the saving habits of whites and
minorities diverge. Just 57% of non-whites with incomes between $20,000 and $40,000
annually have set aside any money for retirement, while 71% of white individuals with
similar incomes have saved for retirement. Halfof-Adults Expect to Benefitfrom Social
Security, Survey Says, 25 PENS. & BEN. REP. (BNA) 808, 808 (1998).
52. See OPPORTUNITY, supra note 51, app. II, at 19 & 23 (using data from 1992
Survey of Consumer Finances and Health and Retirement Survey, finding that black
workers nearing retirement age slightly more likely to be without pension coverage than
white workers and black workers more likely to be covered by defined benefit plan (that
rarely, if ever, requires workers to make investment decisions) while white workers more
likely to participate in 401(k) plan (that often requires workers to make investment
decisions)); Kathy Catrambone, Women FaceBarriersin Retirement, PENS. & INVEST.
June 1, 1998, at 34 (noting that Dreyfus's 1997 Gender Investment Comparison Study
of households with income greater than $50,000 found that "almost 50% of female
respondents claim to lack the time, money and knowledge necessary to invest for
retirement"); J. Engen, BrokerageServices: NDB 'sAffinity RelationshipBrings On-Line
Trading to ProfessionalWomen, AM. BANKER, June 3, 1998, at 13A (noting that in a
1997 study commissioned by Oppenheimer Funds, Inc., 62% of women in married
households manage the checkbook while only 15% manage investments); Betty A.
Rubin, Tapping into the Fast-GrowingWomen's Market, PRIVATE ASSET MGMT., July
3, 1999, at 9 ("A nationwide study of women between the ages of 35-54 conducted by
Executive Female Magazine revealed that 71% said they did not know how to invest.
More than a third of the respondents had never ventured forth to make an investment
decision.").
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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likely to result in their receiving lower rates of return under a partially privatized
Social Security system. 3
Investing wisely requires knowledge,54 or at least good advice, and those
with less investment experience are likely to have less investment knowledge
and less access to good advice.55 Results from a 1993 Merrill Lynch household
survey confirm that men generally perform better than women, whites better than
blacks, and higher-income respondents better than lower-income respondents in
tests on financial knowledge.56 The relative lack of investment experience and
knowledge of the at-risk groups suggests that they are likely to enter a partially
privatized Social Security system at a disadvantage.5 7

53. Cf B. Douglas Beruheim, FinancialIlliteracy, Education, and Retirement
Saving, in LIVING WITH DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PENSIONS 38,43 (Olivia S. Mitchell &
Sylvester J. Schieber eds., 1998) (stating that "existing literature demonstrates that most
Americans know little about managing personal finances and their choices reflect their
ignorance").
54. Cf C. COLBURN HARDY, DUN & BRADSTREET'S GUIDE TO YOUR INVESTMENTS
17 (21st ed. 1976-1977) ("There is no rule book or mysterious key to success in the stock
market. Whether investment or speculation, it's a business of common sense, faith,
courage, knowledge, and patience-with a reasonable amount of luck.").
55. See John Williamson, Should Women Support the Privatizationof Social
Security?, CHALLENGE, July 17, 1997, at 97. Williamson states:
Partial privatization would offer the most benefits to those who are in a
position to obtain good investment advice. Such advice is more available to
the affluent than to low-income households. Because women are more likely
to be living in low-income households, they generally have less access to
good investment advice.
Id.
56. Bernheim, supra note 53, at 47-48 (noting that "[d]ifferences based on gender
and race are statistically significant, even holding other variables (such as education and
earnings) constant .... [F]inancial scores rise with eamings, and this increase is
statistically significant").
57. Of course, providing investment education may help level the playing field.

See infra Part III(A)(3).
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2. Risk Aversion
To the extent that they do save for retirement, lower-income workers tend
to be more risk averse58 than higher-income workers. 9 Since women and
minorities (other than Asians) 60 tend to earn lower wages,6 the fact that lowerincome workers tend to be more risk averse suggests that women and minorities
may also tend to be more risk averse.

58. "Aperson is risk averse if she prefers a certain return on an investment to an
uncertain return with an expected value equal to the certain return." Barry E. Adler,
Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 439, 457 n.76 (1992). "Given a
choice between a 50% chance of losing $100 and the certainty of losing $50, a risk
averse person would choose to lose $50. A risk preferring person would rather take the
50% chance of losing $100, while a risk neutral person would have no preference." Jill
Gaulding, Note, Race, Sex, and Genetic Discriminationin Insurance: What's Fair?,80
CORNELLL. REV. 1646, 1651 n.22 (1995).
59. See, e.g., OPPORTUNITY, supra note 51, at 24 (showing that higher-income
workers tend to invest more heavily in stocks than do lower-income workers based on
data from the 1992 Survey of Consumer Finances and the Health and Retirement
Survey); Vickie L. Bajtelsmit & Jack L. VanDerhei, Risk Aversion and Pension
Investment Choices, in POSITIONING PENSIONS FOR THE TwENTY FIRST CENTURY 45, 60
(Michael S. Gordon et al. eds., 1997) (finding lower-income workers tend to be more risk
averse than higher-income workers according to a study based on a sample of 20,000
active management participants for a single, large U.S. employer); Gordon P. Goodfellow
& Sylvester J.Schieber, Investment of Assets in Self-Directed Retirement Plans, in
POSITIONING PENSIONS FOR THE TwENTY FIRST CENTURY

67 (Michael S. Gordon et al.

eds., 1997) (pooling administrative records on slightly more than 36,000 participants
drawn from 24 defined contribution plans holding nearly $1.4 billion in total assets,
finding higher-wage workers somewhat more aggressive in their investments than lowerwage workers); Richard P. Hinz et al., Are Women ConservativeInvestors? Gender
Differencesin Participant-DirectedPensionInvestments, in POSITIONING PENSIONS FOR
THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY 91 (Michael S. Gordon et al. eds., 1997) (finding higherincome participants significantly more likely to contribute to a common stock fund than
lower-income counterparts based on 1990 Thrift Savings Plan data); PAUL YAKOBOSKI
& JACK VANDERHEI, WORKER INVESTMENT DECISIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF LARGE 401(K)

PLAN DATA (EBRI Issue Brief No. 176, 1996) (study of asset allocations of 401(k) plans
of three large employers provides some evidence that lower-income workers tend to be
more risk averse than higher-income workers).
60. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
61. See, e.g., U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, MONEY INCOME FOR THE UNITED
STATES: 1997 CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, CONSUMER INCOME P60-200 vii tbl.A,
28-29 tbl.7 (1998) (reporting that in 1997 the median earnings of full-time, year-round
working women was 74% of that of men ($24,973 versus $33,674) and that the median
income of white-non-Hispanic men was $36,118, black men was $26,897, and men of
Hispanic origin was $21,799 while the median income of white-non-Hispanic women
was $26,470, black women was $22,764, and women of Hispanic origin was $19,676).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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Examining gender differences in investment behavior is a relatively new
field of academic inquiry,62 and examinations of investment behavior based on
race are even rarer. 3 Nevertheless, a number of recent studies confirm that
women 64 and blacks65 tend to be more risk averse than men and whites.
Moreover, some of the studies show that women 66 and blacks 67 (at least black

62. For a survey of the literature, see Vickie Bajtelsmit & Alexandra Bernasek,
Why Do Women Invest Differently than Men, 7 COUNSELING & PLANNING 1 (1996).
63. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY AND MINORITIES:
CURRENT BENEFITS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR REFORM GAO/T-HEHS-99-60 5 (1999)

[hereinafter IMPLICATIONS] (noting that no research had previously been done on
minorities' investment patterns).
64. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM:
IMPLICATIONS FOR WOMEN'S RETIREMENT INCOME, GAO REPORT TO THE RANKING
MINORITY MEMBER, SUBCOMM. ON SOCIAL SECURITY, HOUSE COMMIfTEE ON WAYS AND

MEANS GAO/HEHS-98-42 (1997) [hereinafter WOMEN'S RETIREMENT INCOME] (using
data from Health and Retirement Study and controlling for demographic characteristics,
wealth, and income, finding that, on average, the ratio of riskier assets to total assets held
by men was eight percentage points higher than the same ratio for women);
OPPORTUNITY, supra note 51, at 24 (using data from the 1992 Survey of Consumer
Finances and the Health and Retirement Survey, finding that female workers tend to be
more risk averse or conservative investors than male workers); Bajtelsmit & VanDerhei,
supra note 59, at 60 (suggesting, in a study based on sample of 20,000 active
management participants for a single, large U.S. employer, that women are more likely
than men to invest in "less risky" fixed-income assets rather than "more risky" equities.
(Bajtelsmit and VanDerhei, however, do not view their study as establishing conclusive
evidence of gender differences in risk aversion because they did not have complete
information on marital status and other household wealth and income)); Hinz et al., supra
note 59, at 91 (finding men significantly more likely to hold risky assets than women
even when salary and other family income are held constant based on 1990 survey data
of participants in Thrift Savings Plan); Nancy Ammon Jianakoplos & Alexandra
Bernasek, Are Women More Risk Averse?, 36 ECON. INQUIRY 620 (1998) (finding single
women relatively more risk averse than single men and married couples based on data
from the 1989 Survey of Consumer Finances on allocation of total household wealth);
William B. Riley Jr. & K. Victor Chow, Asset Allocation and IndividualRisk Aversion,
48 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 32 (1992) (finding, based on empirical study of individual asset
allocation and risk behavior using financial data for large random sample of U.S.
households, women are slightly more risk averse than men and risk aversion decreases
as income increases).
65. IMPLICATIONS, supra note 63, at 5 (finding that, controlling for income and

education, black IRA holders tend to be somewhat more conservative investors than
whites based on national survey data); Andrew F. Brimmer, Issues in the Black
Community: Income, Wealth, and Investment Behaviorin the Black Community, 78 AM.
ECON. REv. 151, 155 (1988) (showing that proportionately more whites than blacks in
the $30,000 to $40,000 income bracket participated in the stock market, and that the
blacks who did participate tended to invest more heavily in securities issued by
companies with the highest credit ratings).
66. See WOMEN'S RETIREMENT INCOME, supra note 64, at 9-10; Hinz et al., supra
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss2/1
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men)68 tend be more risk averse, even when income and wealth are taken into
account. The evidence with respect to blacks, however, does not extend to all
income groups," and a study that included Hispanics found that Hispanics may
be no more risk averse than whites when income is taken into account. It may
fund industry
also be worth noting that two recent studies funded by the mutual
70
found that women tend to be no more risk averse than men.

note 59, at 92.
67. See IMPLICATIONS, supranote 63, at 5; Brimmer, supra note 65. In addition,
a January 1998 survey by Jankelovick Partners shows that, controlling for income, blacks
tend to be more conservative investors than whites. Specifically, comparing the
investment habits of 500 blacks and 732 whites, the study found that black households
with incomes exceeding $50,000 invest more conservatively than do similar white
households.
Blacks, the survey said, are less likely to trust investment advisers, had less
exposure to the stock market in their upbringing and have a cultural
preference for real estate and insurance over stock ....

46% of blacks

surveyed consider real estate the best investment overall, while 50% of whites
said stocks were the best vehicles for financial growth. Also according to the

survey, just 57% of blacks reported having any money in the stock market
In fact, 63% of the blacks surveyed
compared with 81% of whites ....
described themselves as conservative investors, compared with 53% of
whites.
Peter Alan Harper, Survey: Under-investing in Stocks Leaves Blacks with Less for
Retirement, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Apr. 19, 1999, at D2; see also George Raine,
UrgingBlacks to be Bullish; Seminars to Stress MoreAggressive Investment Strategies,
SAN FRANCISCO ExAM'R, Apr. 19, 1998, at B1 (noting that blacks have "culturally
imbued conservative approach to finance"). For additional discussions of this survey,
see Survey Reveals Differences Between African-American, White Investors, 25 PENS. &
BEN. REP. (BNA) 873 (1998); Peter Alan Harper, Survey Shows Blacks and Whites Tend
to Invest Money Differently, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 1998, at C5; Survey Finds Racial
Divide in Attitudes Toward Investment Study: Black HouseholdsAre Less Likely Than
Whites To Own Stocks, PreferringReal Estate and Insurance,L.A. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1998,

at Dl.
68. See Brimmer, supra note 65, at 155 (noting that brokers report that among
black investors young women are much more active in the stock market than are black
men in the same income and age categories); Jianakoplos & Bemasek, supranote 64, at
627 (finding that single black women are willing to hold a larger proportion of risky
assets on average than single white women, black single men, and black married
couples).

69. The Brimmer study showed that blacks with incomes in the range of $40,000
to $50,000 tend to invest in the market in a similar manner to whites with that range of
income. See Brimmer, supra note 65, at 155.
70. See Women as Aggressive as Men with 401(k)s, Study Finds
<http://www.watsonwyatt.com/homepage/Pres-Rel/MAY98/401k-tm.html>; see also
Diane Harriscover, Why More Women Say ... I Don't Need Your Money, Honey;
Women Today are Investing More and Getting Better Returns, MONEY, Nov. 1996, at

146.
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To the extent that members of the at-risk groups tend to be more risk averse,
they are likely to receive lower rates of return under a partially privatized Social
Security system. Capital market history shows that as investment risk increases
so does investment return. For example, U.S. Treasury bills, about the safest of
investments,7' provided an average nominal return of 3.7% over the period of
73
1926 to 1994.72 In contrast, common stocks, which are much riskier assets,
provided an average nominal return of 12.2% over the same period.74 Basic
financial theory teaches that that differential, or risk premium, rewards investors
for accepting higher risk.' Thus, to the extent that the at-risk beneficiaries are
unwilling or unable to assume greater risks, they should expect lower returns.76
3. Investment Education
By providing workers with investment education, a partially privatized
Social Security system could offset some of the risk of more vulnerable

Women are investing much more assertively than tfiey have in the past.
National studies of both 401(k) investors and mutual fund holders show that
women are shifting their assets out of savings accounts that simply preserve
their principal and into growth-oriented investments like individual stocks and
equity mutual funds. Roughly equal proportions of men (74%) and women
(71%) fundholders now invest in stock funds, according to the Investment
Company Institute, the mutual fund trade organization. And both sexes
allocate nearly equal percentages of their portfolios to equities: 47% for men,
46% for women.
Id.
71. See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
FINANCE 143-44 (5th ed. 1996).
72. Id. at 146.
73. The standard deviation of the market portfolio, which is generally represented
by the S & P's composite index, is about 20% per year. Id. at 152.
74. Id. at 146.
75. Id. at 180. Brealey and Myers stated:
Wise investors don't take risks just for fun. They are playing with real
money. Therefore, they require a higher return from the market portfolio than
from Treasury bills. The difference between the return on the market and the
interest rate is termed the market riskpremium. Over a period of 69 years the
market risk premium (rm - rf) has averaged 8.4 percent a year.
Id.; see also ROBERT A. HAUGEN, MODERN INVESTMENT THEORY 207 (4th ed. 1997)
("[T]he expected return on a stock is equal to the risk-free rate (compensating investors
for delaying consumption over the planning horizon), plus a risk premium (compensating
them from taking on the risk associated with the investment).").
76. See, e.g., Hinz et al., supra note 59, at 99 (estimating that after 35 years of
participation in the Federal Thrift Savings Plan at historical yields and identical
contributions, women would have pension portfolios that are 16% smaller than those of
men because of women's relative risk aversion).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss2/1
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beneficiaries receiving lower rates of return.77 Efforts have been made on 7a
variety of fronts to educate Americans about retirement savings in recent years.
For example, Congress recently enacted the Savings Are Vital to Everyone's
Retirement (SAVER) Act 79 which is intended, among other things, "to advance

the public's knowledge and understanding of retirement savings and its critical80
importance to the future well-being of American workers and their families."
Similarly, employers have increasingly made efforts to provide their employees

with retirement education.8 ' Financial firms and civic organizations have also

77. Cf Transcript #98040902FN-L08 for Show: Take It Personally (Apr. 9, 1988)
(noting that misconceptions and misperceptions of African-Americans that lead to their
investing more conservatively can be overcome by more education and more AfricanAmerican role models). For an extensive discussion of the importance of investor
education and the role the government should play in providing that education, see James
A. Fanto, We're All CapitalistsNow: The Importance,Nature,ProvisionandRegulation
of Investor Education, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 105 (1998). See also WOMEN'S
RETIREMENT INCOME, supra note 64, at 14 (noting that it is not clear who would provide
investment education in the case of individual retirement savings accounts under a
privatized Social Security system); Social Security: SSA 's Apfel Promotes Clinton
Surplus Plan, Cool to PrivateAccount Carve-Out Proposals,26 PENS & BEN. REP.
(BNA) 293, 294 (1999) (noting that SEC Commissioner Paul Carey has said that
"investor education should be a key component of any steps in th[e] direction [of creating
individual accounts], especially since many potential account holders will not have
previous investing experience").
78. See Fanto, supra note 77, at 108.
79. Pub. L. No. 105-92, 111 Stat. 2139 (1997) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1146-1147
(Supp. 1111997)).
80. 29 U.S.C. § 1146 (Supp. III 1997). For a more detailed discussion of the
SAVER Act and other governmental efforts to educate the public as well as a critique of
some of those efforts, see Fanto, supra note 77, at 146-78.
81. About 62% of employers surveyed in the KPMG Peat Marwick 1998
Retirement Benefits Survey said that they offered their employees financial education on
saving and investing for retirement, up from 46% in 1995. See Retirement Planning:
Employers Not Planningto IncreaseBenefits to Cover Any Social Security Reductions,
25 PENS. & BEN. REP. (BNA) 1859, 1869 (1998); see also B. Douglas Bernheim,
Financial Illiteracy, Education, and Retirement Saving, in LIVING WITH DEFINED
CONTRIBUTION PENSIONS: REMAKING RESPONSIBILITY FOR RETIREMENT 38, 39 (Olivia

S. Mitchell & Sylvester J. Schieber eds., 1998) (noting that as of 1994, 88% of large
employers offered some form of financial education, more than two-thirds of which
added these programs after 1990). For discussions of the types of education employers
provide and the impact of the various types of education, see, for example, CAN WE SAVE
ENOUGH TO RETIRE? PARTICIPANT EDUCATION INDEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS (EBRI

Issue Brief No. 160, 1995) [hereinafter ISSUE BRIEF No. 160]; PARTICIPANTEDUCATION:

ACTIONS AND OUTCOMES (EBRI ISSUE BRIEF No. 169, 1996) [hereinafter IssuE BRIEF
No. 169]; YAKOBOSKI & VANDERHEI, supra note 59.
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increased efforts to provide individuals with investment education,82 and have
directed some of those efforts specifically at women 3 and minorities.8 4
Experience with employer-provided retirement education suggests that
educational efforts can and do make a difference. First,85 studies show that
employer-provided retirement education increases both the number of employees
who participate in retirement savings plans and the amount that they save in
these programs.8 6 More importantly, a couple of recent surveys87 reveal that

82. See Fanto, supra note 77, at 140-46 (describing and critiquing investor
education provided by the private market).
83. See Juliette Fairley, Spinster Boomers FaceRough Retirement, INVESTOR'S
Bus. DAILY, Feb. 20, 1998, at B1. Fairley stated:
Scudder Kemper has used the study in developing a series of seminars and
how-to manuals geared toward helping women prepare for retirement. Lin
Coughlin, a managing rector of Scudder Kemper, says she's working on a
brochure for women that tells them what they need to do to take charge of
their financial futures.
Id.; see also Engen, supranote 52, at 13A (discussing intemet investment site designed
to focus on and serve women); Janet L. Fix, BuildingNest Egg Often Hardfor Women,
Minorities, ORANGE COUNTY REG., July 12, 1998, at K01 ("Increasingly, women, if not
minorities, are being targeted as a group that needs or wants education on saving and
investment. More investment companies are targeting women. Recently, Vanguard
Group published a booklet, "Women and Investing: A step-by-step guide to your
personal finances.").
84. Maria T. Padilla, Minority Interestin Market Grows; But It's Been a HardSell
for Wall Street, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Dec. 7, 1997, at 12. Padilla noted:
More minority professionals and groups are trying to change the way
minorities think about money by teaching their brethren about investing. For
example, Orlando's African-American, Hispanic and Asian-American
chambers of commerce have sponsored financial seminars for members. 'We
are trying to get the small-business entrepreneur to be aware there is more to
saving money,' said Lita Martija of the Asian American Chamber of
Commerce.

Id.; see also Humberto Cruz, No-strings Seminar Fills Need for Blacks, LEXINGTON
HERALD-LEADER,

Oct. 11, 1998, at F1 (discussing free personal-investment planning

seminar sponsored by Nova Southeastern University and the Broward YMCA at the Y's
L.A. Lee Branch in a predominantly black section of Fort Lauderdale, Fla.); Raine, supra
note 67, at B-1 (describing nationwide seminars, organized by Coalition of Black
Investors, to discuss market principles and opportunities with blacks).
85. Of course, since most partial privatization proposals mandate participation at
a particular rate, these studies are not directly relevant.
86. See, e.g., PATRICK J. BAYER ET AL., THE EFFECTS OF FINANCIAL EDUCATION
INTHE WORKPLACE: EVIDENCE FROM A SURVEY OF EMPLOYERS (National Bureau Econ.

Research Working Paper No. 5655, 1996) (finding in study of retirement education
provided by large employers that frequent provision of retirement seminars positively
affects participation in and contributions to 401(k) plans, particularly among lower-paid
employees); B. DOUGLAS BERNHEIM & DANIEL M. GARRETr, THE DETERMINANTS AND
CONSEQUENCES OF FINANCIAL EDUCATION IN THE WORKPLACE: EVIDENCE FROM A
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employer-provided education can and does impact allocation decisions,

8

and

(National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 5667,
1996). Based on household survey data collected by Merrill Lynch in the fall of 1994,
Bernheim & Garrett found that:
[A]vailability of retirement education also increases the overall rate of saving
by 1.65 percentage points, and raises the rate of saving for retirement by just
under one percentage point. Both effects are large relative to median rates of
saving for those who do not have access to retirement education in the
workplace (6% and 3% respectively) and both are statistically significant at
high levels of confidence.
Id.; see also Bemheim, supra note 53, at 61-62 (finding in a study based on plan
sponsors who attended a Merrill Lynch conference on 40 1(k) plans that controlling for
other factors, participation in 401(k) plans is, on average, 18.5% points higher in firms
that offer retirement education than in firms that do not offer such education); Robert L.
Clark & Sylvester J. Schieber, FactorsAffecting ParticipationRates and Contribution
SURVEY OF HOUSEHOLDS

Levels in 401(k) Plans,in LIVING WITH DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PENSIONS: REMAKING
RESPONSIBILrIY FORRETIEMENT 69, 74, 85 (Olivia S. Mitchell & Sylvester J. Schieber

eds., 1998) (study based on data collected by Watson Wyatt of 401(k) plans for 19 firms
ranging from 700 to 10,000 employees finds that quality of communication regarding
401(k) plans affects participation rates; providing generic materials in addition to
required forms and statement increases probability of worker participating in plan by
15%; providing information specifically tailored for company's own plan increases
probability of worker participating in plan by 21%); ISSUE BRIEFNO. 160, supra note 81,
at 18-19 (according to a 1994 survey by Employee Benefits Research Institute and
Matthew Greenwald and Associates, 33% of the workers who reported reading
educational material provided by their employer reported that the materials led them to
increase the amount of their contributions; according to the survey, 92% of those
receiving educational material reported reading it); PAUL YAKOBOSKI & JENNIFER
DICKEMPER, INCREASED SAVING BUT LITTLE PLANNING:

RESULTS OF THE 1997

RETIREMENT CONFIDENCE SURVEY 14 (EBRI Issue Brief No. 191, 1997) (noting that
"[i]n a Rogers Casey/Institute of Management and Administration (IOMA) survey, 75
percent of responding 401(k) plan sponsors said that participation rates in their plan
increased due to participant communication").
87. Unfortunately, there have been few studies on how retirement education affects
allocation. See WOMEN'S RETIREMENT INCOME, supra note 64, at 14 (noting that few,
if any, studies have examined how education affects the allocation decisions of 401(k)
participants); cf Bernheim & Garrett, supra note 88, at 4 (noting that due to data
limitations they were unable to study the effects of education on portfolio allocation).
88. ISSUE BRIEF No. 169, supra note 81, at 7. The authors of Issue Brief No. 169
noted that according to the 1995 Employee Benefits Research Institute/Matthew
Greenwald and Associates Retirement Confidence Survey, almost half of workers using
educational material provided by their employer reported that they changed their
allocation decisions as a result of the educational material. The effect was slightly more
likely among those with a high school diploma or less than among workers with more
education. "Interestingly, while workers with less formal education (i.e., a high school
degree or less) are less likely than their peers to utilize educational material that is
provided, when they do use the material, they seem to be equally or more likely than their
peers to alter their behavior as a result." ISSUE BRIEF No. 169, supra note 81, at 7.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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that 401(k) participants are making better investment choices as a result of
additional education and growing sophistication.89
Thus, furnishing investment education could help all workers, including the
at-risk populations, to invest wisely. Providing additional education, however,
is unlikely to eliminate all differences between the rates of return at-risk
beneficiaries and higher-income white males are likely to receive.
Basic financial theory teaches that not only can investors who take on
greater risk expect greater returns,9" but investors who accept higher risk are not
guaranteed higher returns. Investment risk means that future returns are
unpredictable; 9 the greater the chance of low returns, the riskier the
investment. 92
Not all Social Security beneficiaries are equally able to handle investment
risk. Some beneficiaries rely more heavily on Social Security for their
retirement income than do others. As a whole, women93 and minorities" tend to

Similarly, the authors of Issue Brief No. 160 noted that according to the 1994 Employee
Benefits Research Institute/Matthew Greenwald and Associates Retirement Confidence
Survey, of the 92% of respondents who reported reading the educational material or
seminars provided by their employers, 44% reported that they changed the allocation of
their money among the available options as a result of relying on the material. ISSUE
BRIEFNO. 160, supra note 81, at 19; see also YAKOBOSKI & DICKEMPER, supra note 86,

at 14 (stating that "the RCS found that among users of educational material, 49 percent
report that it led them to change the allocation of their money among the investment
options offered").
89. Workers Gain Growing Number of Options in Employer-Sponsored Section
401(k) Plans, 25 PENS. & BEN. REP. (BNA) 435 (1998) (noting that in a report Hewitt
Associates, 401(k) Trends and Experience 1997, only 40% of employers felt their plan

participants were investing too conservatively in 1997, compared with 53% in 1995).
90. Cf HAUGEN, supra note 75, at 176 ("Collectively, you would expect the
payoffs to these risk variables to be positive, with stocks having greater exposures to the
variety of risk attributes having greater expected rates ofreturn."); ISSUE BRIEF NO. 160,
supranote 81, at 12 (comparing risk and return of portfolios with stock, bonds, t-bills,
and cash and noting that portfolio consisting of 100% cash would be expected to provide
smallest degree of volatility risk at price of lowest expected return).
91. BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 71, at 166; see also EUGENE F. BRIGHAM,
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 119 (3d ed. 1982) ("Investment risk,

then, is related to the probability of low or negative returns-the greater the chance of
low returns, the riskier the investment.").
92. See BRIGHAM, supra note 91, at 119.
93. Nonmarried women aged 65 or older relied on Social Security for 51% of their
total money income in 1996, while nonmarried men of the same age relied on Social

Security for just under 40% of their total money income that year. U.S. DEP'TOF HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVICES, INCOME OF THE POPULATION 55 OR OLDER, 1996, at 124 tbl.VII.6
(1996).
94. White aged units 65 or older relied on Social Security for 40% of their total
money income in 1996 while black aged units 65 or older relied on Social Security for
42% of their total money income and aged units 65 or older of Hispanic origin relied on
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss2/1
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rely somewhat more heavily on Social Security for their retirement income than
do men and nonminorities. In addition, older individuals with lower incomes
rely on Social Security for a significantly larger percentage of their income in
retirement than do those with higher incomes.95
The more a Social Security beneficiary relies on Social Security for her
retirement income, the less she is able to bear investment risk on that income.
Thus, Social Security beneficiaries who rely more heavily on Social Security for
their retirement income may be well-advised to invest their social security
individual account more conservatively than those beneficiaries who have other
sources of retirement income.96 Accordingly, to the extent that individual
members of the at-risk groups rely disproportionately on Social Security for their
retirement income, they may be well-advised to invest more conservatively than
higher-income white males and thus expect lower rates of return than higherincome white males.57 On the other hand, to the extent that individual members

Social Security for 45% of their total money income that year. Id. at 123 tbl.VII.4.
White aged units 65 or older received a larger share of their retirement income from
private pensions and annuities and income from assets than did similarly aged blacks and
Hispanics while blacks and Hispanics relied on earnings and public assistance for a larger
percentage of their retirement income than did whites. Id.
95. Aged units in the two lowest quintiles of income relied on Social Security for
more than 80% of their total money income in 1996, while aged units in the highest
quintile relied on Social Security for little more than 20% of their total money income
that year. Id. at 123 tbl.VII.5; see also ALAN L. GUSTMAN ET AL., PENSION AND SOCIAL
SECURITY WEALTH IN THE HEALTH AND RETIREMENT STUDY 41, 75 tbl.15 (NBER

Working Paper No. 5912, 1997). Gustman et al. stated:
[S]ocial security wealth accounts for a declining portion of wealth as average
wealth increases, falling from over 100 percent of net wealth for the bottom
five percent of households (counting those with negative wealth), and falling
smoothly as one proceeds up the wealth distribution to 7 percent of wealth for
the top five percent of the distribution.
Id.
96. See PracticalIssues Raised by Reforming Social Security With a System
Including PersonalSecurity Accounts: Testimony Before House Ways and Means

Comm., 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Sylvester J. Schieber), available in 1998 WL
327364 (noting that study of 401(k) plans found that workers at low-earnings levels
invested more conservatively than those with higher incomes and contending that the
portfolio allocations "are not wildly off base and the variations by earnings and age level
follow a rational pattern that is consistent with the way educated investors would
invest"); Adler, supra note 58, at 457 n.76 (finding risk aversion reasonable and
declaring "[c]onsider a worker on whom her family relies for its sustenance. Although
there are exceptions, the worker is unlikely to gamble her entire wealth on an investment
that has an equal chance of doubling her investment or dissipating it entirely."); Kijakazi,
supra note 17, at 9 (stating that "lower-income groups have less investment experience
and would be more likely to invest in an overly conservative manner because they could
not afford to expose the funds in their accounts to much risk").
97. On the other hand, to the extent that these higher risk groups can rely on
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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of the at-risk groups do not rely disproportionately on Social Security for their
retirement income, investment education should teach them to be less risk
averse, and they should not expect lower rates of return if they act in accordance
with that education.
4. Conclusion
Although a partially privatized Social Security system would subject all
workers to investment risk, there is reason to believe that the at-risk beneficiaries
would not be able to bear that investment risk as well as higher-income white
males. First, the at-risk groups tend to have less investment experience than do
higher-income white males. Absent education, this relative lack of experience
is likely to lead to their receiving lower rates of returns under a partially
privatized Social Security system. Second, to the extent that the more vulnerable
populations have investment experience, they tend to be more risk averse than
higher-income white males. This relative risk aversion is likely to lead to their
receiving lower rates of return.
Providing all workers with investment education may help to level the
playing field but is not likely to protect all members of the at-risk groups from
receiving lower rates of return under a partially privatized Social Security
system. To the extent that they rely disproportionately on Social Security for
their retirement income, the at-risk beneficiaries may be well-advised to remain
relatively more risk averse and thus expect lower rates of return under a partially
privatized system. While these differential returns may be consistent with Social
Security's goal of individual equity,98 they hardly appear consistent with its
social adequacy goal; that is, its goal of providing progressive redistribution to
lift the elderly out of poverty.99
B. Payout of Benefits
The present Social Security system pays benefits in the form of a life
annuity; ° that is, it pays beneficiaries a fixed amount per month based upon a

welfare programs to make up for any lost Social Security benefits, they may in fact be
well-advised to accept relatively greater investment risks because the government rather
than the worker would bear the risk of loss.
98. For a more detailed discussion of Social Security's competing goals of equity
and social adequacy, see Moore, supranote 12, at 162-64; Moore, supra note 15, at 96970.
99. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
100. See CONGRESsIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY PRIVATIZATION AND
THE ANNUITIES MARKET 1 (1998) ("An annuity provides a stream of payments for an
agreed-upon period of time; a life annuity provides payments for as long as the annuitant
is alive and protects against longevity risk.").
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss2/1
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complex benefit formula.'' Because the benefit formula does not take life
expectancy into account in calculating benefits (other than making adjustments
for individuals who begin to receive before or after their normal retirement
age),' 0 2 the system favors individuals with higher life expectancies while
disadvantaging those with shorter life expectancies."
Thus, the current
system's method of paying out benefits tends to favor those at-risk beneficiaries
who have higher life expectancies, specifically, women, Hispanics, and Asians,
while disfavoring blacks and lower-income workers who have lower life
expectancies.'
Some partial privatization proposals would also require that benefits be paid
out in the form of a life annuity. For example, the Advisory Council's IA plan
requires that workers' individual account balances be annuitized upon
retirement."'° Similarly, the Committee for Economic Development favors
requiring workers to annuitize their individual account balances upon
retirement, 1' and the National Commission on Retirement Policy recommends
that individuals be required "to annuitize that portion of their individual savings
account balances which, when added to their traditional Social Security benefit,
10 7
is necessary to provide an income comfortably above the poverty line.1
If the proposals were to use a single life table in calculating the annuity,
they, like the current system, would disadvantage blacks and lower-income
workers while favoring women, Asians, and Hispanics. In theory, the proposals
could avoid such differential treatment by using gender-, race-, and
socioeconomic-based life tables. In fact, however, using such tables would raise
a host of other public policy objections and would thus seem to be ill-advised.
Of course, not all partial privatization proposals require that benefits be paid
out in the form of a life annuity. For example, the Advisory Council's PSA plan

101. See 42 U.S.C. § 415 (1994). For a discussion of how Social Security benefits
are calculated, see Moore, supra note 3, app.
102. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(q) § (w) (1994); see also 1998 SOCIAL SECURITY
EXPLAINED

535.1.

103. See Moore, supranote 3, § III(A).
104. See Moore, supra note 3, § II(A).
105. I ADVISORY COuNci REPORT, supra note 21, at 28.
106. FIXING SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note 23, at 51. The Archer/Shaw proposal

would also require 100% annuitization upon retirement.

See Clinton Charges

Republicans With Waffling Over Social Security Reform; GOP Denies It, 26 PENS. &
BEN. REP. (BNA) 1167, 1168 (1999).
107. THE 21ST CENTURY RETIREMENT SECURITY PLAN, supranote 24, at 13; see

also Jonathan Barry Forman, Whose Pension Is It Anyway? ProtectingSpousal Rights
in a Privatized Social Security System, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1653, 1680-84 (1998)
(recommending that at a minimum couples be required to annuitize their account
balances to the extent necessary for their total benefits (including first tier benefits) to
provide the equivalent of an indexed annuity equal to 125% of the poverty level).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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would not require workers to annuitize their account balances upon retirement'08
but instead would permit workers to withdraw assets from their second tier
individual accounts as and when they see fit after retirement." 9
Such proposals would eliminate the differential treatment inherent in the
current system's payout of benefits. Thus, at first blush, they would appear to
benefit unequivocally those at-risk beneficiaries with lower life expectancies
who tend to be disadvantaged by the current system's payout of benefits while
disadvantaging those at-risk beneficiaries with higher life expectancies who tend
to benefit from the current system. Nevertheless, the proposals could
disadvantage members of all three of the at-risk groups by subjecting them to
longevity risk, a risk to which they are not subject under the current system and
which they are relatively less able to bear.
Finally, regardless of whether partial privatization proposals mandate or
permit arnuitization of benefits upon retirement, all partial privatization
proposals could put members of the at-risk groups at a relative disadvantage by
subjecting them to the risk of a market downturn. The current Social Security
system does not subject beneficiaries to the risk of a market downturn, and there
is reason to believe that women, minorities, and lower-income workers may be
less able to handle that risk than higher-income white males.
1. Mandatory Annuitization
Since proponents of partial privatization devote far more of their attention
to the accumulation phase of partial privatization than to the payout phase,"' it
is hardly surprising that the proposals provide few details on how the annuities
are to be calculated. The devil, however, is in the details."'

108. See I ADviSORY COUNCIL REPORT, supranote 21, at 30 (stating that "workers
would not be required to annuitize their accumulations at retirement").
109. See I ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 21, at 117 (discussing rationale
for not imposing mandatory annuitization requirement).
110. Cf CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 100, at 1 ("Proponents of
privatization have devoted most of their efforts to deciding how much should be

accumulated in those accounts and how transition costs should be divided among current
and future generations, while virtually ignoring how retirees will draw down the
accumulated funds for use in old age."); Mark J. Warshawsky, The Marketfor Individual
Annuities and the Reform ofSocial Security, 13 BEN. Q. 66 (1997) ("This focus on the
first principles in the public debate has occurred largely in the areas of financing, benefit
computation and asset accumulation. Yet the first principle questions concerning the

payout phase of any federal retirement income program are just as important.").
S11.Cf JAN WALLISER, PRIVATIZING SOCIAL SECURITY WHILE LIMTING ADVERSE
SELECTION IN ANNUITIES MARKETS (1997-5 Technical Paper Series, Macroeconomic

Analysis and Tax Analysis Divisions, Congressional Budget Office 19, 1997) ("An
important and previously ignored question is whether a mandatory annuity would pool
males and females.").
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss2/1
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If a partially privatized system, like the current system, requires the use of
a single life table to calculate annuities, then all workers (of the same age) would
receive the same monthly benefits for the same account balances, but all workers
would not receive the same expected lifetime benefits. Rather, like the current
system, workers with lower life expectancies would, as a group, receive lower
lifetime benefits than would workers with higher life expectancies and,
conversely, workers with higher life expectancies would, as a group, receive
2
greater lifetime benefits than would workers with lower life expectancies."
Such a system would, like the current system," 3 disfavor at-risk
beneficiaries with lower life expectancies," 4 such as blacks"15 and lower-income
workers,"16 while favoring at-risk beneficiaries with higher life expectancies,
such as women," 7 Hispanics," 8 and Asians." 9 A partially privatized Social

112. See Moore, supra note 3, § III(A).
113. See Moore, supra note 3, § I1(A).
114. Life expectancy at about age 65, rather than age 20, is most relevant for these
purposes because that is the approximate age at which workers would be required to
annuitize their account balances. Arguably, partial privatization proposals, like the IA
plan, that require annuitization upon retirement but permit workers who die before
retirement to include their second tier benefit in their estate, see I ADVISORY COUNCIL
REPORT, supranote 21, at 28 n.17, favor those who are more likely to die before age 65.
This advantage would, however, have to be weighed against any reduction the plan may
produce in survivor benefits.
115. See, e.g., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES tbl.129 (1998) (providing that black males at age 65 in 1996 could expect to live
another 13.9 years while their white counterparts could expect to live an additional 15.8
years; black females at that age could expect to live another 17.2 years while their white
counterparts could expect to live another 19 years). But see U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVICES, HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 1998: SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS AND
HEALTH CHARTBOOK

88-89 & fig. 25 (1998) [hereinafter HEALTH CHARTBOOK] (showing

that at age 65 whites and blacks have approximately the same life expectancy once
income is taken into account).
116. See, e.g., HEALTH CHARTBOOK, supranote 115, at 89 fig.25 (showing that life
expectancy rises with family income for both men and women at age 65).
117. See, e.g., HEALTH CHARTBOOK, supra note 115, at 89 fig.25 (showing that
women at age 65 have higher life expectancy than men at every level of income).
118. Most authorities contend that Hispanics have higher life expectancies than
whites at age 65. See, e.g., Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Social Security, House
Comm. on Ways and Means, Social Security and Minorities: Current Benefits and
Implications ofReform, GAO/T-HEHS-99-60 (Statement of Cynthia M. Fagnoni) ("At
age 65, in 1998 ...Hispanic men can expect to live 2.9 years longer than white men.

The projections of life expectancy for white... and Hispanic women at age 65 are
...
19.5 ... and 22.2 years, respectively."); SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, WHY IS
SOCIAL SECURITY IMPORTANT FOR MINORITY GROUPS? 3 (1999) (showing life expectancy

at age 65 in 1995 is 18.5 years for men of Hispanic origin and 15.7 years for their white
counterparts and 21.8 years for women of Hispanic origin and 19.1 years for their white
counterparts); Kijakazi, supra note 17, at 4 ("Hispanic retirees live longer, on average,
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Security system that mandated annuitization of benefits upon retirement could
avoid this differential treatment by using gender-, race-, and socioeconomicbased life annuity tables.

than other Americans-the average American who reaches 65 (including both men and
women) will live an additional 17 2 years, while the average Hispanic reaching 65 lives
an additional 20.5 years.").
Recent work, however, suggests that this differential may be due to underestimated
mortality counts and that Hispanics may in fact have lower life expectancies than whites
at every age. See Mark D. Hayward & Melonie Heron, RacialInequality in Active Life
Among Adult Americans, 36 DEMOGRAPHY 86 tbls.4, 5 (1999) (taking into account
mortality adjustments, finding that white women aged 20 in 1990 had life expectancy of
60.93 compared with 57.74 for their Hispanic counterparts and white men aged 20 in
1990 had life expectancy of 54.59 compared with 48.97 for their Hispanic counterparts
and finding that white women aged 60 in 1990 had life expectancy of 23.58 compared
with 21.46 for their Hispanic counterparts and white men aged 60 in 1990 had life
expectancy of 19.10 compared with 17.21 for their Hispanic counterparts); see also
Fernando M. Trevino, Vital and Health Statisticsfor the US HispanicPopulation,72
AM. J. OF PuB. HEALTH 979 (1982) (discussing some of the limitations on vital statistics
of Hispanics).
119. See SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION OFFICE OF POLICY, supra note 118,
at 3 (showing life expectancy at age 65 in 1995 15.7 for white men, 18.8 for Asian men,
19.1 for white women, and 22.9 for Asian women); CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, 46 MONTHLY VITAL STATISTICS REP. No. I(S), at 7 tbl.B (1997) (study of
7 selected states in 1992 shows that life expectancy of Asian/Pacific Islanders between
the ages of 65 and 74 was 19.9 years, while life expectancy of their white counterparts
was 17.2 years); Hayward & Heron, supra note 118, at 86 (taking into account mortality
adjustments, finding that white women aged 60 in 1990 had life expectancy of 23.58
compared with 26.36 for their Asian counterparts and white men aged 60 in 1990 had life
expectancy of 19.10 compared with 22.22 for their Asian counterparts).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss2/1

30

2000]

Moore: Moore: Partial Privatization of Social Security:
EFFECTOFPARTIAL PRIVATIZATION

Proponents120 of "fair ''121 or "efficient ' ' 22 discrimination would likely
applaud such a system.12 3 Proponents of fair or efficient discrimination believe
that the use of any classifier should be permitted so long as the classifier is
statistically correlated with risk. 2 4 That is, insurers should be permitted "to
fund
measure as accurately as is practicable the burden shifted to the insurance
125
less."'
no
and
more
no
it,
for
exactly
charge
to
and
by the policyholder
Fair or efficient discrimination, however, can run counter to
norms grounded in civil rights law concepts. 2
"antidiscrimination '
120. See, e.g., George J. Benston, The Economics of GenderDiscriminationin
Employee Fringe Benefits: Manhart Revisited, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 489, 512 (1982)
(arguing that "all traits associated with a person should be used to estimate the risk that
the insured against event will occur to that person"); Maria O'Brien Hylton, The
Allocation of Health Care Resources and Its Effect on the Poor: Some Preliminary
Thoughts on the Deregulation of Insurance to Advantage the Working Poor, 24
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 687, 694-95 (1997) (arguing for reevaluation of ban on racial and

other sensitive classifications because reduction in actuarially useful categories of
classifications raises cost of doing business and reduces amount of insurance available
to certain target groups, such as minorities and high risk consumers); Spencer L. Kimball,
Reverse Sex Discrimination: Manhart, 1979 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 83 (advocating use
ofgender-based life tables). See also Herman T. Bailey et al., The RegulatoryChallenge
to Life Insurance Classification, 25 DRAKE L. REV. INS. L. ANNUAL 779 (1976)
(explaining history of and justifications for classifications in life insurance); Brian A.
Jones, Sex Equality in Pension Schemes, in TRENDS ON EUROPEAN SOCIAL POLICY:
ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF MALCOLM MEAD 85 (Jeff Kenner ed., 1993) (criticizing Manhart
and Norris).
121. See Leah Wortham, Insurance Classification: Too Important to be Left to the
Actuaries, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 349 (1986) (describing two principal competing
perspectives on insurance classification as "fair" discrimination and "antidiscrimination").
122. See Gaulding, supra note 58, at 1647 n.7 (describing the two principal
competing views of discrimination in insurance classification as "efficient"
discrimination and "antidiscrimination" but recognizing that commentators have adopted
a variety of terms to describe these two views).
123. Single-minded advocates of Social Security's individual equity goal should
also applaud such a system. Cf.supra note 98 and accompanying text.
124. Gaulding, supra note 8, at 1665 ("Efficient discrimination requires only that
a classifier be statistically correlated with risk.").
125. Kimball, supra note 120, at 105.
126. See supra notes 121-22.
127. Wortham, supra note 121, at 361 ("The antidiscrimination perspective rejects
the traditional fair discrimination approach from a perspective grounded in civil rights
law concepts. This view opposes the use of certain classifications, particularly those
restricted by civil rights laws governing other activities or enterprises."); cf KENNETH
S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 76
(1986). Abraham stated:
Some variables with predictive power may be socially, legally, or morally
inadmissible for use in constructing risk classes. Race, sex, or age, for
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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According to these norms, insurers should not be permitted to use classifiers
unless they are "(a) causally connected to the risk measured, (b) controllable, and
(c) not associated with historical or invidious discrimination."' 28
Today, race-based classifications are uniformly rejected, and
antidiscrimination norms govern in this arena. As early as shortly after the Civil
War, a couple of states"' relied on antidiscrimination norms to ban legislatively
the use of race-based classifications in life insurance.130 The norms, however,
were not widely adopted until the 1960s,' when many states legislatively
banned race-based classifications' or found that they violated their state's
unfair discrimination statutes.'33 In acquiescence to these norms, insurers

example, may be good predictors of certain kinds of loss experience. But race
is almost always an inadmissible consideration, and both sex and age are
sometimes objectionable, depending on the kind of insurance involved.
Id.
128. Lea Brilmayer et al., Sex Discriminationin Employer-SponsoredInsurance
Plans: A Legal and DemographicAnalysis, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 505 (1980) (using
antidiscrimination norms to object to gender-based classifications); Gaulding, supranote
8, at 1674 (offering positive rights theory that supports prohibition of race- and geneticbased classifications while permitting gender-based discrimination); Robert H. Jerry II
& Kyle B. Mansfield, Justifying Unisex Discrimination: Another Perspective, 34 AM.
U. L. REv. 329 (1985) (contending that classifications on basis of race or sex must be
justified by compelling reasons; actuarial justifications not sufficient to support such
discrimination); Wortham, supra note 121, at 368 (contending that ban of classifications
on basis ofrace, color, religion, sex, and national origin "warranted on grounds that have
been advanced by some of those arguing from an antidiscrimination perspective").
129. As a result of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1994),
insurance law is generally regulated by the states rather than the federal government. See
15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1994) ("No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate,
impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the
business of insurance.. ').
130. Wortham, supra note 121, at 365 n.68 (citing MAsS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 175
§ 122 (West 1977) (first passed in 1884); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 500.2082 (West
1983) (first passed in 1869)).
131. Indeed, insurers "routinely charged blacks and whites different rates for life
insurance and annuities" through the 1950s. See Jerry & Mansfield, supra note 128, at
351 (citing DANM. MCGILL, LIFE INSURANCE 393-94 (Rev. ed. 1967) (discussing use of
racial criteria in insurance rating)).
132. See Gaulding, supra note 58, at 1659 & n.86 ("Some states passed statutes
specifically forbidding the use of race as a classifier.").
133. See Gaulding, supra note 58, at 1659-60 (stating that "other states assumed
this result under their unfair discrimination statutes"); see also Herman T. Bailey et al.,
supra note 120, at 793 ("In the civil rights era, some states adopted statutes providing
specifically that race (and often creed, national origin and religion) was not to be a

criterion for determining whether insurance would be available to a given individual;
other states assumed this result under their unfair discrimination statutes.").

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss2/1
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134
converted to race-neutral life tables by the late 1960s,
and by the 1980s
1 35
all.
at
classifications
race
use
not
did
they
that
claimed
Gender-based classifications, on the other hand, are much more

controversial.1 36 In Arizona Governing Committeefor Tax DeferredAnnuity &
CompensationPlansv. Norris, 37 the United States Supreme Court held that Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits the use of gender-based actuarial tables in
converting an employer's defined contribution account to an annuity at
retirement.138 In contrast, most states 139 permit insurers to use gender-based
annuity tables when issuing individual life annuities,1 40 and, at least one state,
California, actually requires the use of1 gender-based
tables in calculating
41
premiums for life insurance and annuities.
Unlike race- and gender-based classifications, socioeconomic-based
classifications are rarely discussed. Nevertheless, it appearsthat insurers rarely,
if ever, use such classifications to calculate life annuities. 42 Thus, if a partially
privatized Social Security system were to use socioeconomic-based life tables,
it would appear to be breaking new ground.
At first blush, using race-based life annuity tables might appear to be good
public policy. If only two classifications were used, whites and non-whites, nonwhites would receive larger monthly benefits than whites because non-whites
have lower life expectancies than whites.1 43 Thus, the use of race-based life

134. Jerry & Mansfield, supra note 128, at 352 n.139 (1985) (noting that
"[i]nformation regarding this transformation is sparse").
135. Gaulding, supra note 58, at 1660.
136. For a lengthy list of articles entering into this debate, see Wortham, supra note
121, at 356 n.31.
137. 463 U.S. 1073 (1983).
138. Id. at 1074; see also City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart,
435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978) (holding that Title VII prohibits employer from requiring
female employees to contribute more to a pension fund than male employees in order to
receive same benefit).
139. But see Gaulding, supra note 58, at 1662 ("Only Montana flatly forbids sex
discrimination in insurance.") (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-309 (1991)).
140. Gaulding, supra note 58, at 1662 ("Most states tolerate the use of sex as a
classifier as a form of fair discrimination; where regulators have attempted to ban sex
discrimination under unfair discrimination statutes, courts have rebuffed them, stating
that actuarially sound discrimination 'cannot be unfair."').
141. Gaulding, supra note 58, at 1662 (citing CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(f) (West
1993)).

142. Telephone interview with Brian A. Jones, Adjunct Professor, College of
Insurance in New York, Consulting Actuary (Apr. 22, 1999) (confirming that very few,
if any, insurance companies use socioeconomic-based life tables when issuing annuities);
Telephone interview with Herb Pettersen, Actuary (May 26, 1999) (concurring with Mr.
Jones's assessment).
143. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL AND PREVENTION, NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, VITAL
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annuity tables would seem to benefit rather than harm those "associated with
historical or invidious discrimination" and thus be laudable.
Upon more careful reflection, however, the use of race-based life annuity
tables would seem to constitute bad public policy. First, our society finds the use
of race-based classifications repugnant, whether they benefit or harm the
protected group.'" In fact, the 1979 Social Security Advisory Council rejected
a proposal to make unreduced Social Security retirement benefits available at an
earlier age to minority groups with lower life expectancies because, among other
reasons, it believed that "as a matter of policy, there should be no explicitly
different treatment of racial or ethnic groups under Social Security."'45 Second,

since there is no universally accepted definition of race,' 46 establishing criteria
and determining whether a particular individual belongs to a particular group
could be socially disruptive and administratively difficult.'47 Moreover, the use
of race-based classifications would not necessarily benefit all non-whites. For

STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1994, Vol. II, pt. A, sec. 6, tbl.6-3, at 10 (1998)
(showing life expectancy of all races, whites, all races other than white, and blacks).
144. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (holding
that "all racial classifications [whether they benefit or harm the protected group],
imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a
reviewing court under strict scrutiny"); cf.Jerry & Mansfield, supra note 128, at 353
(noting that "[l]ess expensive annuities could be sold to blacks ....[But that] insurers
have been unwilling to use race to calculate insurance rates and premiums because
society collectively considers such a practice repugnant").
145. HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 96TH CONG., REPORT OF THE 1979
ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY 136 (Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter 1979
REPORT]. The other reasons it offered were: (1) a belief that the Social Security system
as a whole did not treat minorities unfavorably, and thus it would be unfair to the
majority to offer significant benefits only to minorities; (2) at least as between blacks and
whites, the differential in life expectancy is attributable principally to mortality
differences before age 55 and thus it would be inappropriate to offer early retirement
benefits to offset this mortality differential; and (3) determining whether a particular
individual belongs to a specific racial or ethnic group could create formidable
administrative difficulties and establishing the criteria could be socially disruptive. See

1979 REPORT, supra, at 136-37.
146. See, e.g., Michael Omi & Harold Winant, Racial Formations, in POWER,
A CIVIL RIGHTS READER 159, 160 (1995) ("Race is indeed a preeminently sociohistorical concept. Racial categories and the meaning of race are given
concrete expression by the specific social relations and historical context in which they
are embedded. Racial meanings have varied tremendously over time and between
different societies."); Luther Wright, Jr., Note, Who's Black, Who's White, and Who
Cares: Reconceptualizing the United States's Definition of Race and Racial
Classifications,48 VAND. L. REV. 513, 517 (1995) ("'The word 'race' defies precise
PRIVILEGE AND LAW:

definition in American Law.' No physical attribute or collection of physical attributes
adequately defines 'race."') (citation omitted)).
147. See 1979 REPORT, supra note 145, at 137.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss2/1
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example, although blacks have lower life expectancies than whites,'48 other
5
groups,'49 such as Hispanics, 5 ° have higher life expectancies than whites.1 ' A
system that classified Hispanics separately from whites could result in Hispanics

receiving smaller monthly benefits than whites for the same account balances,
although members of the two groups would receive equal expected lifetime
benefits. Finally, using race-based classifications to benefit a protected group
could open the door to the use of such classifications to harm protected groups,

contrary to the very purpose of civil rights statutes.
Permitting or requiring the use of gender-based life annuity would also
appear to be bad public policy. Given women's somewhat greater reliance on
Social Security for their retirement income 52 and their greater risk of poverty in
old age,'53 it would appear to run counter to Social Security's social adequacy
55
goal'" to permit or require insurers to pay women lower monthly benefits' than
men for the same account balances simply because women have higher life
57
for the
expectancies than men. 5 6 Moreover, it would seem inappropriate

148. See supra note 115.
149. Given the indeterminancy of the term 'race,' it is not clear which groups
should be treated as a separate race. Hispanics are sometimes treated as a separate race,
sometimes not. See Wright, supra note 147, at 537-38, 548-50 (discussing inconsistency
in classification of Hispanics).
150. As discussed note 118 supra, there is some question as to whether this higher
life expectancy is due to underestimated mortality counts and that Hispanics in fact have
lower life expectancies than whites.
151. Asians also have higher life expectancies than whites at age 65. See supra
note 119.
152. See supra note 93.
153. See infra Part III(E)(1).
154. Ofcourse, using gender-based tables may be consistent with Social Security's
goal of individual equity. Cf.supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
155. See WOMEN'S RETEREMENT INCOME, supranote 64, at 11-12 & tbl. 1 (showing
average monthly benefit paid to men and women at different ages, based on $100,000
premium in current individual annuity market which permits use of gender-based life
tables).
156. For married workers purchasing joint and survivor annuities, annuity
payments would depend on the age of each of the spouses in the couple rather than the
gender of the worker purchasing the annuity. Thus, much of the disparate impact created
by the use of gender-based annuity tables would be eliminated in the case of married
workers purchasing joint and survivor annuities rather than single-life annuities. Cf I
ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 21, at 28 (explaining that Advisory Council's
IA plan permits a married worker (with the consent of the spouse) to choose between a
single or 'joint and survivor' annuity).
157. Although the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 made Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act applicable to the legislative branch ofthe Federal Government, see P.L.
104-1, § 102(a)(2), 109 Stat. 3, 5 (1995), determining whether Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act does or should apply to a federally mandated partially privatized Social
Security system goes beyond the scope of this Article.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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federal government to require employer-based retirement plans to use unisex life
tables while permitting or requiring insurers to use gender-based 58tables under a
federally mandated partially privatized Social Security system.1
The use of socioeconomic-based life tables does not raise the same public
policy concerns as the use of race- or gender-based classifications. Our society
does not view economic-based differentiation with the same suspicion as race-

and gender-based distinctions. 15 Moreover, socioeconomic-based classifications
would likely ensure that all lower-income workers receive higher monthly
benefits than higher-income workers for the same account balances because

158. Such a provision may well violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Analyzing whether the use or prohibition of gender-based annuity tables
would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, however, goes beyond
the scope of this Article. For cases in which the United States Supreme Court has
considered Due Process challenges to Social Security provisions that imposed genderbased distinctions, see Heckler v. Matthews, 465 U.S. 728 (1984) (upholding rule
requiring only male spouses in certain circumstances to show dependency); Califano v.
Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (upholding definition of "elapsed years" for benefit
computation purposes that includes three fewer years for women than for men); Caifano
v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (holding unconstitutional imposition of financial
dependence test on widower's benefits but not on widow's benefits); Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 36 (1975) (holding unconstitutional provision of survivor benefits
to widows, but not widowers). For a discussion of these cases, see Mary E. Becker,
Comment, Obscuring the Struggle: Sex Discrimination,Social Security, and Stone,
Seidman, Sustein & Tushnet's ConstitutionalLaw, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 264, 271-76

(1989). Cf Kimball, supra note 120, at 105-06 n.54 (noting that federal statute that
prohibited use of gender-based life table would leave "possible constitutional issue:
Whether such a rule is, inter alia, an unconstitutional denial of equal protection to men
in annuities and women in life insurance").
159. For example, for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, racial classifications are viewed as
"suspect" and thus subject to strict scrutiny review. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN
E. NOVACK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 18.5,
at 294 (3d ed. 1999). Gender-based classifications are viewed as semi-suspect and
subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny. Id. § 18.20, at 518. Classifications based on
wealth are not viewed as suspect and thus are generally subject to rational basis review.
Id. § 18.25, at 560. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1, 28, 44 (1973) (finding that wealth is not a suspect class and thus classifications based
on wealth subject to traditional rational basis review). Similarly, civil rights statutes
generally prohibit discrimination on the basis of race and gender but do not extend their
protection to class-based discrimination. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994)
(prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin); 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1994) (prohibiting discrimination in housing on basis
of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 344.040 (Michie 1997) (prohibiting employment discrimination on basis of race, color,
religion, national origin, sex, or age forty and over, or status as smoker).
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lower-income workers, no matter their race or sex, almost always have lower life
expectancies than their higher-income counterparts.160
Nevertheless, it still may not be wise to require the use of socioeconomicbased tables. First, since insurers do not currently use socioeconomic-based life
tables to calculate life annuities, the creation of such tables may be too costly and
thus inefficient. 161 Moreover, if neither race- nor gender-based tables are used,
it would seem inappropriate to establish socioeconomic distinctions.
2. Voluntary Annuitization of Lump Sum Accumulations
By not requiring that second tier benefits be annuitized upon retirement,
partial privatization proposals, like the Advisory Council's PSA plan, eliminate
the differential treatment inherent in the current system's payout of benefits. 62
Thus, such proposals would appear to benefit unequivocally those at-risk
beneficiaries with lower life expectancies, such as blacks and lower-income
workers, who tend to be disadvantaged by the current system's payout of
benefits, while disadvantaging those at-risk beneficiaries with higher life
expectancies, like women, Hispanics, and Asians, who tend to be favored by the
current system's payout ofbenefits 63 In fact, however, members of all three of
the at-risk groups could still be disadvantaged by a partial privatization proposal,
like the Advisory Council's PSA plan, that does not mandate the annuitization
of the second tier account balance upon retirement.
By promising beneficiaries a specified amount per month for life, the
current Social Security system protects workers against longevity risk; that is,
the risk of outliving their assets.'6' Similarly, partial privatization proposals, like

160. See supra note 116. But see C. J. L. MURRAY

ET AL.,

U.S. PATTERNS

OF

1965-1994, U.S. BURDEN OF DISEASE AND INJURY
MONOGRAPH SERIES 8, 10 (1998) (noting that (1) one of the poorest regions in the
MORTALITY BY COUNTY AND RACE:

country, the Texas border with Mexico, is a region with above average life expectancy,
and (2) life expectancy for black males does not always rise with income).
161. Cf.ABRAHAM, supranote 127, at 78. Abraham stated:
[A]n efficient classification system does not strive to make its premiums equal
expected cost beyond the point where that goal is worth achieving.
Information about risks is accumulated and risk classes are refined only so
long as competitive benefits of refinement are worth their cost. Consequently,
all individual differences are not recognized by a classification system. When
an insurer can no longer attract or make enough profit from additional lowrisk insureds to justify discovering and classifying them, an equilibrium is
reached, and no further refinement occurs.
ABRAHAM, supra note 127, at 78.
162. See Moore, supranote 3.
163. See supranotes 112-29 and accompanying text.
164. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supranote 100, at 1 ("Annuities like
Social Security provide insurance against longevity risk-that is, the risk of outliving
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the Advisory Council's IA plan, that require workers to annuitize their individual
account balances upon retirement, also protect workers from the risk of outliving
their individual account balances. In contrast, partial privatization proposals,
like the Advisory Council's PSA plan, that impose no restrictions on the
withdrawal of second tier assets after retirement subject workers to the risk of
outliving their individual account balances. 65
Although proposals like the Advisory Council's PSA plan would subject
all workers to the risk of outliving their second tier benefit, not all workers are
equally able to bear that risk. The more a Social Security beneficiary relies on
Social Security for her retirement income, the less she is able to bear the risk of
outliving any of that income.'66 As discussed above,167 women and minorities
tend to rely somewhat more heavily on Social Security for their retirement
income than do men and nonminorities, and older individuals with lower
incomes rely on Social Security for a significantly larger percentage of their
income than do those with higher incomes. Thus, the proposals like the

Advisory Council's PSA plan that subject workers to the risk of outliving their
second tier benefit would appear to disproportionately disadvantage women
and
1 68
minorities to some extent and lower-income workers to a greater extent.
Arguably, members of the at-risk groups could protect against this longevity
risk by voluntarily purchasing individual life annuities from the private market
with their account balances upon retirement. 69 These individuals, however,

165. Of course, to the extent that they guarantee a first tier benefit, they do not

subject workers to the risk of outliving all Social Security benefits.
166. Again, as noted above, under a partially privatized system, workers would still
be guaranteed some benefits for life from their first tier benefit.
167. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
168. In addition, as the proponents of the Advisory Council's PSA plan note, there
is a moral hazard that these groups might intentionally exhaust their individual account
balances prematurely if other federal safety net programs are available to these retirees
and the programs tie eligibility to low assets. To protect against this moral hazard, the
proponents of the PSA plan contend that it might be appropriate to require annuitization
of the account balances of retirees who cannot show that they have annuity incomes from
Social Security and private savings that equal the poverty level or some multiple thereof

over their life expectancy, although they ultimately reject this requirement. See I
ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 21, at 117; see also Warshawsky, supra note

112, at 70 (contending that any partial privatization proposal "should require
annuitization to avoid moral hazard problems upon the introduction of the new system").
169. Indeed, a Congressional Budget Office paper asserts that the demand for
annuities would probably increase, especially for low- and median-income households
if Social Security benefits were reduced. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra
note 100, at 21.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss2/1
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might be forced to accept less than actuarially fair rates of returns17 ° if they were
to annuitize their individual account benefit upon retirement.",
Economists have found that yields on individual life annuities are lower
than yields on alternative long-term fixed-income investments. 2 Thus,
experience in the current individual life annuity market suggests that at-risk
retirees who elect to annuitize their account balances upon retirement could be
subjected to lower rates of return on their account balances than retirees who can
afford the risk of outliving their account balances and thus can invest their
account balances outside of the individual annuity market.'73
Of course, past market experience may not be a good predictor of
experience under a partially privatized Social Security system. Although the

170. The rate of return on an annuity is actuarially fair if it is equal to the rate of
return on riskless bonds. See Andrew B. Abel, CapitalAccumulation and Uncertain
Lifetimes with Adverse Selection, 54 ECONOMETRICA 1079, 1082 (1986).
171. Cf CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supranote 100, at 2 ("Private annuities
are currently 15 percent to 25 percent more expensive than average mortality would
suggest.").
172. For example, Friedman and Warshawsky have found that the expected yields
offered on individual life annuities in the United States during 1968 through 1983 were
lower on average by 4.21-6.13% per annum, or 2.43-4.35% per annum after allowing for
adverse selection, than yields on alternative long-term fixed-income investments.
Benjamin M. Friedman & Mark J. Warshawsky, The Cost of.Annuities: Implicationsfor
Saving Behavior and Bequests, 105 Q. J. ECON. 135, 152 (1990) [hereinafter Cost of
Annuities]. Similarly, Mitchell, Poterba, and Warshawsky found that the average
individual life annuity policy delivered payouts valued at between 80 and 85 cents per
dollar of annuity premium in 1995. OLIVIA S. MITCHELL ET AL., NEW EVIDENCE ON THE

MONEY'S WORTH OF INDIVIDUAL ANNUITIES (National Bureau of Econ. Research

Working Paper No. 6002, 1997); see also Benjamin M. Friedman & Mark Warshawsky,
Annuity Prices and Saving Behavior in the United States, in PENSIONS INTHE U.S.
ECONOMY 53, 59 (Zvi Bodie et al. eds., 1988) [hereinafter Annuity Prices] (contending
that individual life annuities have an average load factor of 32-48 cents per dollar, 14-15
cents of which is attributable to adverse selection while 18-33 cents represents the
insurer's costs, taxes, and profits).
173. To the extent that these lower returns are due to adverse selection, see infra
note 179, they would not occur under a partially privatized system that mandated
annuitization of benefits upon retirement because such a system would necessarily
eliminate adverse selection. To the extent, however, that they are due to other factors,
they may or may not occur under a partially privatized system that mandates
annuitization of benefits upon retirement.
In correspondence with the Author, Brian A. Jones has suggested that life insurers
offer a "Round-Out" annuity contract that would pay installments for life only after the
end of a fixed payout period. The "Round-Out" annuity would be a deferred annuity that
would be paid at the end of the payout period only if a worker outlived his life
expectancy. Jones believes that this product would be a useful supplement to IRAs and
other current retirement benefits as well as useful under a partially privatized system that
permits but does not require annuitization of second tier benefits.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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individual annuity market is well-developed in this country, 74 few ofthe elderly
currently participate in that market.' 75 Moreover, those who do participate in the
market 7 6 tend to have higher life expectancies,' and their higher life
expectancies 17' explain, at least in part, the lower yields on individual life
annuities. 7 9 If participation in the individual annuity market were to increase

174. See, e.g., Annuity Prices,supra note 172, at 53 (noting that "a well-developed

individual life annuity market does exist in the United States").
175. Cost of Annuities, supra note 172, at 136 n.2 (noting that the Retirement
History Survey indicates that only 2% of the elderly population own individual annuities
of any sort); see also CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supranote 100, at 5-8 (offering
reasons for small size of single-premium immediate annuities market).

176. There are a wide variety of annuities available on the market today. For a
general discussion of the annuities market, see, e.g., JAMES M. POTERBA, THE HIsTORY
OF ANNUITIES IN THE UNITED STATES (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper
No. 6001, 1997). This section, however, focuses on single-premium immediate annuities
(SPIA) because they are typically paid out in the form of a life annuity, while other
annuities may often be paid out in other forms. See MITCHELL ET AL., supra note 172,
at 5. The Congressional budget office report noted:
According to data of the Life Insurance Marketing Research Association
International (LIMRA), most people who purchased a SPIA from any of 26
companies included in a survey chose an annuity for life (single-premium
immediate life annuities, or SPILAs). SPILAs closely parallel current Social
Security annuity payments in all respects but one: they are not indexed for
inflation. Therefore, prices for SPILAs most accurately reflect the cost of
insurance against longevity risk at retirement ....
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 100, at 4.
177. MITCHELL ET AL., supra note 172, at 14 ("When compared within the same
year and cohort, the mortality probabilities for both men and women in the general
population at every age are higher than the mortality probabilities for annuity
purchasers.").
178. Mitchell, Poterba, and Warshawsky note that the mortality difference may be
due to two nonexclusive factors: (1) individuals with higher than average net worth may
live longer than those without substantial assets, and (2) individuals who purchase
individual annuities may live longer, on average, than those who do not purchase such

annuities.

MITCHELL ET AL.,

supra note 172, at 14. The second factor is frequently

referred to as adverse selection. See Warshawsky, supra note 110, at 70 (noting that
adverse selection "occurs ifindividuals with higher-than-average mortality risk, such as
those with serious illness or with inherited or behavioral predispositions toward certain
diseases, conclude that annuities are too expensive for them and thereby avoid the
purchase of annuities").
179. See, e.g., MITCHELL ETAL., supra note 172, at 21 ("Adverse selection appears
to explain roughly half of the disparity between the expected discounted present value
of annuity payouts, and the cost of an individual annuity, from the standpoint of an
average individual."); Annuity Prices,supra note 172, at 59 (contending that between
one-third and one-half of load factor of individual life annuities is attributable to adverse
selection, while the remainder represents the insurer's costs, taxes, and profits); Cost of
Annuities, supranote 172, at 152 (contending that about half of lower yield on individual
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss2/1
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substantially, and more individuals with average or lower-than-average life
expectancies were to enter the market, yields on individual life annuities would
likely increase.'°
Increased yields would benefit minorities and lower-income workers who
chose to annuitize their second tier account balances upon retirement. Women,
however, would be less likely to benefit from increased yields. Most life
insurers currently use gender-based annuity tables when issuing individual life
annuities and pay women lower monthly payments than men for the same
premium.' 8' Unless a partially privatized system were to require insurers to use
unisex life tables, as they currently must for annuities for employer-provided
retirement plans,' women who voluntarily chose to annuitize their account
balance on retirement would likely receive lower monthly payments than men
for the same premium, although their lifetime benefits would be actuarially
equivalent.
3. Risk of Market Downturn
Regardless of whether they mandate or permit annuitization of benefits
upon retirement, all partial privatization proposals subject workers to the risk of
a market downturn, a risk that is not present in the current Social Security
system. That risk could have a disproportionately adverse effect on all three of
the at-risk groups.
While the average real return on stocks in the United States has been about
seven percent over the last one hundred years,8 3 returns over shorter periods of
time have fluctuated enormously.184 These market fluctuations could have a
dramatic impact on returns particular workers can earn, depending on the year

life annuities attributable to adverse selection); see also CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
OFFICE, supra note 100, at 10-13 (discussing the effect of adverse selection on pricing
in the annuities market).
180. Cf CONGRESsIoNAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 100, at 21-22 (discussing

study that shows that cost of adverse selection could fall by one to two percentage points
if Social Security benefits were entirely replaced by individual accounts); MITCHELL E"
AL., supra note 172, at 29 (noting that mandating a national annuity pool could alter the

set of individuals who purchase annuities and thus alter the pricing of the products).
181. See WOMEN'S RETmEMENT INcOME, supra note 64, at 11-12 & tbl.1 (showing
average monthly benefit paid to men and women at different ages, based on $100,000
premium).
182. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
184. See Moore, supra note 12, at 154-55; see also John D. Reas & Richard G.
Marcis, Responses ofMutual FundInvestors to Adverse Market Disruptions,in LIVING
WITH DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PENSIONS: REMAKING RESPONSIBILITY FOR RETIREMENT

136, 141 (Olivia S. Mitchell & Sylvester J. Schieber eds., 1998) (describing market
cycles between World War II and 1994).
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in which they retire.' For example, an individual account earning the inflationadjusted S&P 500 rate from 1967 to 1986 would have earned 3.7% over that 21year period. In contrast, an individual account earning the inflation-adjusted
S&P rate from 1965 to 1984 would have earned just 1.4% over that 19-year
period. 8 6 Similarly, an individual account earning interest at the inflationadjusted interest rate for corporate bonds from 1970 to 1980 would have earned
3.2% over that 10-year period while an individual account earning interest at the
inflation-adjusted interest rate for corporate
bonds from 1965 to 1984 would
87
have earned -1% over that 9-year period.
In a partially privatized system that mandated annuitization of benefits upon
retirement, these market fluctuations might be viewed as affecting all individuals
who retire at the same time equally (though they could create inequities in the
treatment of individuals who retire in different years, or even months, depending
on how the annuities are calculated). 8 On the other hand, to the extent that atrisk beneficiaries rely disproportionately on Social Security benefits for their
retirement income," 9 market fluctuations may be said to have a
disproportionately adverse impact on these groups because they are less able
than other beneficiaries to bear the risk of a market downturn 90
Arguably, under a partial privatization proposal that permits but does not
require annuitization of individual account balances upon retirement, all workers

185. Moore, supranote 12, at 154-55.
186. PROPOSAL TO PRIVATIZE, supranote 33, at 8.
187. PROPOSAL TO PRIVATIZE, supra note 33, at 8.

188. Jeffrey N. Gordon has proposed a financial product, a "pension equity collar,"
that could resolve this timing problem. This product, which would be offered through
investment banks, would guarantee investors a floor value for stock in exchange for
which investors would give up the gain above a certain level. See Jeffrey N. Gordon,
Employees, Pensions,and the New Economic Order,97 COLuM. L. REV. 1519, 1563-64
(1997); see also Peter A. Diamond, The Economics of Social Security Reform, in
FRAMING THE SOCIAL SECURITY DEBATE: VALUES, POLITICS, AND ECONOMICS

38 (R.

Douglas Arnold et al. eds., 1998). Diamond stated that:
This risk can be somewhat attenuated by annuitizing part of the fund in
successive years near retirement age or by allowing the worker some choice
as to the date of annuitization. Also the risk can be hedged by moving the
accumulation portfolio to one predominantly of long-term bonds, which
matches the portfolio used by insurance companies when pricing annuities.
Id.
189. See supra notes 93-94 (explaining that women and minorities tend to rely
somewhat more heavily on Social Security for retirement benefits).
190. To the extent that other beneficiaries rely on private defined contribution
plans for additional retirement income, they may be no better able to handle market
fluctuations with respect to their social security benefits than are at-risk beneficiaries.
Beneficiaries who rely on defined benefit plans or other assets not tied to market
fluctuations for additional retirement income, however, may be better able to bear market
fluctuations with respect to their social security benefits.
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could avoid the adverse effects of a market downturn by not touching their
individual account balances during market downturns. At-risk beneficiaries,
however, may be less able than other beneficiaries to ride out market downturns.
To the extent that at-risk beneficiaries disproportionately rely on Social Security
benefits for their retirement income, they may be less able than others to limit
their social security income to their first tier benefit. 191 Thus, partial privatization
proposals that permit but do not require annuitization upon retirement could also
adversely impact at-risk beneficiaries due to the risk of market downturns.
4. Conclusion
Mandatory annuitization of a partially privatized Social Security system
raises a significant issue regarding how those annuities are to be calculated. If
a single life table were used, then mandatory annuitization, like the current
system, would disfavor those at-risk groups with lower life expectancies, such
as blacks and lower-income workers, and favor those at-risk groups with higher
life expectancies, such as women, Asians, and Hispanics. Partial privatization
proposals could eliminate this differential treatment by using race-, gender-, and
socioeconomic-based life annuity tables, but would contravene other important
public policies in doing so.
Partial privatization proposals that impose no restrictions on the withdrawal
of assets from the second tier after retirement could eliminate the differential
treatment inherent in the current system's payout of benefits and thus, relative
to the current system, favor blacks and lower-income workers and disfavor
women, Hispanics, and Asians. An analysis of such proposals' effect on at-risk
beneficiaries, however, does not end there.
Unlike the current system, partial privatization proposals that do not
mandate annuitization of second tier benefits upon retirement subject workers
to the risk of outliving their second tier benefit. To the extent that at-risk
beneficiaries rely disproportionately on Social Security for their retirement
income, they may be less able to bear that risk than are higher-income white
men. At-risk beneficiaries could avoid the risk of outliving their individual
account balances by voluntarily annuitizing their second tier benefit upon
retirement. If they were to voluntarily annuitize their benefits, however, current
individual annuity market trends suggest that they could be forced to accept
lower rates of return than retirees who can afford the risk of outliving their
individual account balances. If enough at-risk beneficiaries were to annuitize
their second tier benefits voluntarily, rates of return might improve relative to the

191. The ability of other beneficiaries to ride out market downturns would depend
on the source of their other retirement income. To the extent that other beneficiaries
relied on private defined contribution plans for additional retirement income, they would
be no more able to limit their social security income to first tier benefits than would atrisk beneficiaries.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000

43

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 2 [2000], Art. 1

MISSOURLA WREVIEW

[Vol. 65

current market. Nevertheless, women would not necessarily benefit from
improved rates of return. If insurers continued to use gender-based life tables
under a partially privatized system, women who voluntarily annuitized their
individual account balances would receive lower monthly benefits than would
similarly situated men, although their total lifetime benefits would be actuarially
equivalent.
Finally, all partial privatization proposals subject workers to the risk of a
market downturn, a risk that is not present in the current Social Security system.
Because members of the at-risk groups may rely disproportionately on Social
Security for their retirement income, they may be less able than other
beneficiaries to bear the risk ofa market downturn they must face under a system
that mandates partial privatization, and they may be less able to ride out and thus
avoid the adverse effect of a market downturn under a system that permits but
does not require annuitization upon retirement.
C. ProgressiveBenefit Formula
The current Social Security system uses a progressive benefit formula to
calculate benefits that is specifically designed to redistribute income from
higher-paid workers to lower-paid workers.' 92 Since women and minorities
(other than Asians) tend to be lower-paid,' 93 the current system's progressive
benefit formula tends to benefit all three of the at-risk groups (with the exception
of Asians).!94
Partial privatization could jeopardize political support for the progressivity
inherent in the current Social Security system's progressive benefit formula.
This potential reduction or even elimination of progressivity could have a
disproportionately adverse effect on the benefits of all three of the at-risk groups
(with the exception of Asians) because they tend to benefit from the current
system's progressive benefit formula.
A partially privatized system cannot, by definition, use a progressive benefit
formula to calculate the second tier benefit. The second tier benefit is provided
through a defined contribution account which bases benefits on contributions and

192. Specifically, for those reaching age 62 in 1999, the formula replaces 90% of
the first $505 of average indexed monthly earnings, plus 32% of average indexed
monthly earnings between $505 and $3,043, plus 15% of average indexed monthly
earnings above $3,043. See BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF SOCIAL SECURITY TRUST FUNDS,
106TH CONG. REPORT ON FEDERAL OLD-AGE & SURVIVOR INSURANCE & DISABILITY
INSURANCE (1999). For a more detailed discussion of how Social Security benefits are

calculated, see Moore supranote 3, app.
193. See supranotes 18, 60-61 and accompanying text.
194. For a full discussion of how the current system's progressive benefit formula
redistributes income within the current Social Security system, see Moore, supra note 3,
§ III(B).
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earnings or losses on those contributions, and not on a defined benefit formula.19 5
Nevertheless, a partially privatized system could still retain the progressivity of
the current benefit formula in one of two ways: (1) by providing for matching
contributions to private accounts on a progressive basis,'96 or (2) by adjusting the
first tier formula to recover the subsidy higher-wage workers currently provide
lower-wage workers through the progressive benefit formula.'97
Although a partially privatized system could, in theory, provide for
progressive contributions to the second tier,19 partial privatization proposals
rarely provide for such contributions. 9 Instead, most proposals limit
progressivity to the first tier benefit.2°
Some of the partial privatization proposals provide for a flat first tier

benefit. The Social Security Advisory Council's PSA plan, for example,

195. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
196. Of course, progressive contributions could not guarantee progressive benefits
because benefits from a defined contribution plan are always subject to investment risk.

Progressive contributions, however, would at least provide some level of progressivity
in the second tier benefit.
197. See, e.g., PROPOSAL TO PRIVATIZE, supra note 33, at 6-7 (describing benefit
adjustment devised that recovers subsidy high earners would have provided to low
earners).
198. Cf. Laurence J. Kotlikoff et al., Social Security and the Real Economy:
Evidence and Policy Implications, Social Security: PrivatizationandProgressivity,88
AM. ECON. REV. 137 (1998) (developing model that gradually fully privatizes Social
Security while retaining its redistributive effects by providing for matching contributions
to individual accounts on a progressive basis and financing transition costs with a
consumption tax).
199. For a rare proposal providing for progressive contributions to individual
accounts, see Elizabeth A. White, SocialSecurity: SperlingCallsfor PreservingSurplus
in Response to ProposedPrivate Accounts, 25 PENS. & BEN. REP. (BNA) 1725, 1725
(1998) [hereinafter Sperling] (discussing Roth bill that would provide for flat $250 plus
additional amount based on worker's share of payroll taxes to be deposited in each
individual account). See also 'Progressive'Formulafor PrivateAccounts Included in
ProposalSantorum to Offer, 26 PENS. & BEN. REP. (BNA) 575 (1999) (describing Social
Security reform bill that Senator Santorum plans to introduce that would create formula
under which lower-income workers would divert higher percentage of their payroll taxes
into individual accounts); Elizabeth A. White, Social Security: BipartisanSenate Group
Unveils Reform Bill IncludingPrivate Accounts, 26 PENS. & BEN. REP. (BNA) 1407
(1999) (discussing bipartisan bill to be introduced that will provide for government match
of voluntary contributions of low-income workers).
200. The absence of proposals that provide for progressivity in the second tier may
be attributable to the fact that advocates of privatization or partial privatization generally

support severing Social Security's provision of individual equity from that of social
adequacy. Cf DIFFERENT APPROACHES, supra note 33, at 26-27 (discussing annuitywelfare model of Social Security); Moore, supra note 12, at 162-68 (discussing current

system's balancing of individual equity and social adequacy and how privatization relates
to that balance).
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provides for a flat first tier benefit for all workers under age 25 in 1998 equal to
$410 per month in 1996, or the equivalent of 65% of the current poverty level
for an elderly persons living alone or 76% of the benefit payable to a low wage
worker retiring in 1996.20 Because first tier benefits are funded with a 7.4%
payroll tax2 2 which requires that higher-wage workers make larger absolute
contributions to the system than lower-wage workers,2 3 the flat first tier benefit
provides lower-wage workers with a higher return on their contributions than it
does higher-wage workers and thus is progressive. °4
Other proposals base first tier benefits in part on earnings but use a
progressive benefit formula to calculate those benefits. The Social Security
Advisory Council's IA plan, for example, uses a progressive benefit formula to
calculate benefits. Specifically, the IA plan retains the current system's 90%
replacement rate for low earnings and decreases the current system replacement
rate for middle and high earnings from 32% to 22.4% and 15% to 10.5%,

respectively.

5

The National Commission on Retirement Policy proposes both

a minimum benefit, for which individuals would be eligible after twenty years
of covered earning, and a first tier benefit based in part on earnings. 2°6 Like the
IA plan, the National Commission's proposal would gradually decrease the
replacement rates for middle and high earnings. 7
Although proponents of partial privatization typically express support for
the current system's progressivity, 21 partial privatization could put Social
Security's progressivity at risk. If partial privatization were as successful as
proponents predict, middle- and higher-income workers should receive
substantially higher rates of return from their second tier individual account
benefits than from their first tier benefits,2" and these higher rates of return could

201. I ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 21, at 31.
202. I ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supranote 21, at 30.
203. Of course, the progressivity ceases once the maximum taxable wage base is
reached. See 26 U.S.C. § 3121(a)(1) (Supp. III 1997). For a more detailed discussion
of the taxable wage base, see Moore, supranote 3, app.
204. Cf Sperling,supranote 199 (describing how flat contributions under Roth
bill are progressive).
205. I ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 21, at 29. The Committee for
Economic Development makes a similar proposal. See FIXING SOCIAL SECURITY, supra
note 23, at 38-39.
206. See S. 2313, 105th Cong. (1998); H.R. 4256, 105th Cong. (1998) (introducing
proposals from the National Commission on Retirement Policy).
207. S. 2313, 105th Cong. (1998); H.R. 4256, 105th Cong. (1998).
208. See Moore, supra note 15, at 981-82 (giving examples of proponents'
expression of support).:
209. These higher rates of return would be due to two factors: (1) the first tier
benefit would remain funded on a pay-as-you-go basis while the second tier benefit
would be funded in advance, and (2) the first tier benefit would provide for redistribution
while the second would not. See Moore, supra note 15, at 983.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss2/1
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erode political support for the first tier benefit.210 Specifically, middle- and
higher-income workers could point to the substantially higher rates of return
available from the second tier and demand that the first tier be eliminated and all
of their contributions be used to fund their second tier benefit.21'
Of course, partial privatization need not erode political support for the first
tier benefit. 2 Partial privatization might not be as successful as proponents
predict.213 Moreover, even if partial privatization were as successful as
proponents predict, it could increase rather than decrease political support for the
first tier. Having received higher rates of return on their second tier benefit,
middle- and higher-income workers could feel more altruistic and thus more
supportive of the first tier benefit. 214 Such altruism, however, is inconsistent with
the current demand for higher rates of return underlying the push for partial
privatization' 5 as well as trends in charitable giving.2 6 Absent altruism, middleand higher-income workers might still retain support for Social Security's first
tier benefit because it offers benefits not provided by the second tier, such as
disability and dependents' benefits.217 Currently, though, most workers tend to
ignore those benefits, which suggests that middle- and higher-income workers
would not support the first tier benefit for this reason.28
In sum, partial privatization need not upset the progressivity of the current
system. In fact, however, if partial privatization were as successful as
proponents predict, its very success could jeopardize political support for Social
Security's progressive benefit formula. Since all three of the at-risk groups (with
the exception of Asians) benefit from the current system's progressive benefit
formula, partial privatization could have a disproportionately adverse affect on
the benefits of all three of the at-risk populations (other than Asians) by
jeopardizing the progressivity of the system.219

210. See Moore, supra note 15, at 984-85.

211. See Moore, supra note 15, at 984.

212. See Schieber, supra note 3, at 177 ("If we can convince the American people
that it is desirable to create retirement income redistribution through a single-tiered
system by means of a tilted benefit formula, it is inconceivable that we cannot convince
them that similar redistribution is desirable through a two-tiered system.").
213. See Moore, supra note 15, at 985 n.72.

214. See Moore, supra note 15, at 986-87.
215. See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
216. See Moore, supra note 15, at 986-87 (noting that charitable giving does not
steadily rise with income but rather remains relatively constant until income exceeds
$100,000, and even then remains relatively limited).
217. See Moore, supra note 15, at 987.
218. See Moore, supra note 15, at 987.
219. For arguments on the importance of retaining progressivity within the Social

Security system, see DIFFERENT APPROACHES, supra note 32, at 28; Moore, supra note
12, at 164-68; Moore, supra note 15, at 988-92.
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D. DisabilityBenefits

Not only does the current Social Security system pay benefits to retired
workers, but it also pays benefits to qualified disabled workers.220 Proponents
of partial privatization frequently do not address the effect of partial privatization
on disability benefits because, in principle, it is possible to separate disability
benefits from retirement benefits.221 In fact, however, most partial privatization
proposals would reduce disability benefits, albeit, in different ways.
Any reduction in disability benefits is likely to have an adverse effect on
minorities and lower-income workers because they tend to benefit
22
disproportionately from the current system's provision of disability benefits.
The degree to which these groups, and women, would be impacted, however,
depends in large part on whether benefits continue to be based on a progressive
benefit formula, like in the IA plan, or are provided as a flat amount, like in the
PSA plan.
Most partial privatization proposals continue to calculate disability benefits
in a manner similar to that under the current system, but limit the disability
benefit to the first tier benefit available under the partially privatized system.
Because most partial privatization proposals provide a first tier benefit that is
smaller than the total benefit available under the current system, most partial
privatization proposals offer a smaller disability benefit than is available under
the current system.
The Advisory Council's IA plan, for example, continues to calculate
disability benefits in the same manner as under the current system. The IA plan,
however, would adjust the benefit formula to reduce gradually the current
system's replacement rate for middle earnings from 32% to 22.4% and from 15%
to 10.5% for high earnings.223 In so doing, the IA plan would gradually reduce
the first tier benefit and consequently the disability benefit available to middleand high-wage workers. Although the IA plan provides for a second tier benefit

220. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1) (1996). For a discussion of Social Security's
disability benefits, see Moore, supra note 3, app.
221. See DIFFERENT APPROACHES, supra note 33, at 59 ("Disability and
dependents' benefits are often not included in the discussion of individual accounts
because it is, in principle, possible to separate them from retirement benefits.").
222. See Moore, supra note 3, § III(C).
223. I ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 21, at 29; see Moore, supra note
3, app. (discussing the current system's replacement rates and how benefits are
calculated); see also Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Social Security, House Comm.
on Ways andMeans, Social SecurityReform: Implicationsfor the FinancialWell-Being
of Women, GAO/T-HEHS-97-1128 (1997) [hereinafter Well-Being of Women] (Statement
of Jane L. Ross, Director, Income Security Issues, Health, Education, and Human
Services Division of the General Accounting Office) ("On the basis of calculations by
the National Academy of Social Insurance, the IA plan would lower basic benefits by 17
percent for the average earner").
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss2/1
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that might offset some of this reduction in benefit for retired workers, the second
would not be available to disabled workers until they reach age sixtytier benefit
22 4
two.

The PSA plan would also continue to calculate disability benefits in the
same manner as under present law. Those benefits, however, would be capped
at the first tier benefit available under that plan. When fully phased in, the

Advisory Council's PSA plan would provide a full first tier flat benefit of $410
per month in 1996 dollars for workers with thirty-five or more years of covered
employment, while the current system paid retired workers an average of $745
per month in 1996.225 As a result of this substantial reduction in first tier
benefits, the PSA plan would necessarily reduce disability benefits. Indeed,
advocates of the PSA plan acknowledge that when fully phased in,226 the PSA
plan would reduce disability benefits by thirty percent.2 7 Advocates of the PSA
plan express some discomfort with the substantial reduction in disability benefits
that their proposal would produce, 22' but view it as a necessary evil.229 Critics
of the plan, in contrast, view the substantial reduction as unacceptable."o Like
224. DIFFERENT APPROACHES, supra note 33, at 59-60 ("Under the IA plan, the
essential structure of DI would remain intact, but the benefits for DI beneficiaries would
be reduced because individual investment benefits needed to offset the reduction in
program benefits would not be available until age 62.").
225. SOCIAL SECURITYADMNSTRATION, 1997 ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT
TO THE SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN 13 (1997); see also Well-Being of Women, supra
note 223, at 8 ("On the basis of calculations by the National Academy of Social
Insurance... the PSA plan would lower the basic or tier I benefit to about 47 percent of
the benefit paid to today's average earner.").
226. The Advisory Council's PSA plan would begin to reduce benefits by .5%for
workers eligible for benefits in 2000. The size ofthe reduction would increase over time,
reaching 20% for workers eligible for benefits in 2035 and reaching a limit of 30% in
2085. See I ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 21, at 125.
227. I ADVISORY COuNCi REPORT, supra note 21, at 125.
228. I ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supranote 21, at 125 ("Certainly, we would
have preferred to eliminate the subsidies for older people choosing disability benefits
over retirement benefits without reducing protection for younger people with disabilities,
many of whom are seriously disabled and have little choice about working.").
229. I ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supranote 21, at 125. The Report noted:
There was no simple answer to this problem, however. Disabilities do not
tend to be all-or-none, and disability decisions typically are not black-andwhite. There is considerable room for discretion in decision making,
particularly for workers at older ages. The DI program has been growing very
rapidly in recent years and failing to deal with this problem, in our view,
would have been fiscally irresponsible.
Id.
230. I ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supranote 21, at 100. The report noted:
We find it extraordinary that the sponsors of the PSA plan propose reducing
disability benefits for young workers by as much as 30 percent, not by design,
but in their view as the inevitable result of changes they believe are desirable
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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the IA plan, the PSA plan would provide second tier benefits that could help
offset some of this reduction, but the second tier benefit would not be available
"'
until the worker reached retirement age.23
Partial privatization might adversely affect disabled workers in a second
way. Presumably, disabled workers would be unable to contribute to their
second tier individual accounts while they were disabled.232 Their inability to
contribute to their individual account would likely result in disabled workers
having much lower accumulations in their account balances at retirement age
than nondisabled workers.233
Minorities and lower-wage workers benefit disproportionately from the
current Social Security system's disability benefit provisions for two reasons:
(1) they disproportionately benefit from the progressive benefit formula, and
(2) they are more likely to receive disability benefits than are whites and higherincome workers."' Women also tend to benefit disproportionately from the
progressive
benefit formula, but are less likely to receive disability benefits than
23 5
are men.

To the extent that all three at-risk groups disproportionately benefit from the
current Social Security program's disability benefit provisions because of its
progressive formula, it appears that the IA plan's reduction in disability benefits
would not have as great an impact on these groups as on middle- and higherincome workers. As discussed above, the IA plan retains a progressive benefit
formula; it simply decreases the replacement rates for middle- and higher-income
workers. Thus, the IA plan's reduction in disability benefits would appear to
reduce disproportionately the benefits of higher- and middle-income workers,
while essentially retaining the same benefits for lower-income workers.

for older workers.... But, in any event, why is it more important to avoid
notches (or such disparity of treatment) than to avoid poverty for young
disabled workers?
Id.
231. Cf I ADvIsoRY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 21, at 125 (asserting that "the
impact of the PSA proposal on workers who become disabled is mitigated when these
workers reach age 62 and are able to gain access to their PSA accumulations");
DIFFERENT APPROACHES, supra note 33, at 60 (contending that "DI beneficiaries would

not have access to their individual accounts until age 65, the proposed early retirement
age under the PSA proposal").
232. Of course, disabled workers may be viewed as benefitting because they do not
need to pay payroll taxes while they are unable to earn an income. Similarly, under the

current system, disabled workers who have no covered wages do not have to pay payroll
taxes.

233. Arguably, disabled workers may be similarly adversely affected under the

current system because their careers may be cut short and thus they may not have years
of higher earnings that can be taken into account in calculating their retirement benefits.
234. See Moore, supra note 3, § III(C).
235. See Moore, supra note 3, § III(C).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss2/1

50

2000]

Moore: Moore: Partial Privatization of Social Security:
EFFECTOFPARTIAL PRIVA TIZA TION

Although the PSA plan retains some progressivity in its disability benefit
because it provides a flat benefit financed by a percentage of pay,236 it appears
that the PSA plan would decrease substantially the disability benefits for almost
all workers. When fully phased in, the PSA plan would provide a first tier
benefit equal to $410 per month in 1996 dollars, the equivalent of 76% of the
benefit payable to a low-wage worker retiring in 1996.237 This suggests that the
PSA disability benefit would represent a substantial reduction in benefit even for
low-wage workers. Indeed, only 11.5% of disabled workers received monthly
disability benefits of less than $400 in 1996, and another 7.2% of disabled
workers received benefits that ranged between $400 and $450 per month.238
Thus, it appears that the PSA plan would reduce disability benefits for more than
eighty percent of workers, including all three groups of at-risk beneficiaries who
currently benefit from the progressive benefit formula.
To the extent that the partial privatization proposals rely on second tier
benefits to make up for decreased first tier benefits, disabled workers who have
no wages and thus cannot contribute to their individual accounts are
disproportionately adversely affected by partial privatization. Accordingly, to
the extent that minorities and lower-income workers tend to benefit
disproportionately from the current program's disability benefit provisions
because they are more likely to receive those benefits, it appears that both of
these groups would be disproportionately adversely affected by partial
privatization's reduction in those benefits.
Arguably, all workers could protect against partial privatization's likely
reduction in disability benefits by purchasing disability benefits from the private
market. 9 Workers, however, are unlikely to be able to obtain the same
coverage for the same price through the private market. Under the current
system, Social Security disability benefits are universal; that is, they are
available to all workers regardless of age or occupation. The private market, in
contrast, is unlikely to offer universal coverage.24 Moreover, to the extent that

236. See supranotes 201-07 and accompanying text.
237. See I ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 21, at 31.
238. See

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,

SUPPLEMENT TO THE SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN 216
STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT].

1998

ANNUAL

STATISTICAL

tbl.5.D2 (1998) [hereinafter 1998

239. See Schieber, supra note 3, at 162 ("If Social Security did not provide
insurance against disability and premature death, it is likely that many workers would
buy alternative term insurance to cover these contingencies."); cf DIFFERENT
APPROACHES, supra note 33, at 59 (discussing option of purchasing disability insurance
through private market).
240. See DIFFERENT APPROACHES, supra note 33, at 59. The GAO noted:

A key feature of the benefits provided by Social Security is that they are
universal-that is, they are generally available to everyone regardless of age
or occupation. This would generally not be the case with individual disability
insurance policies, and even the current employer-provided group
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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disability insurance is available, it is likely to be more costly for those most
likely to need it.24
E. Auxiliary Benefits
In addition to paying benefits to retired and disabled workers, the current
Social Security system pays auxiliary benefits to the spouses, surviving spouses,
and dependent children of retired disabled and deceased workers.242 Proponents
of partial privatization frequently do not address the effect of partial privatization
on auxiliary benefits for spouses, surviving spouses, and children because, in
principle, it is possible to separate auxiliary benefits from retirement benefits. 3
In fact, however, most privatization proposals would reduce auxiliary benefits.
Partial privatization's reduction in spouse and surviving spouse benefits is
likely to have an adverse impact on the benefits of some, but not all, women. In
addition, partial privatization's reduction in dependent child benefits is likely to
have an adverse impact on nonwhites.
1. Spouse and Surviving Spouse Benefits
Most proposals to partially privatize Social Security retain the current
system's provision of spouse and surviving spouse benefits, but base those
benefits on a percentage 244 of the worker's first tier benefit rather than the
worker's entire benefit, as does the current system.245 Moreover, most partial
privatization proposals provide a first tier benefit that is smaller than the total
benefit promised under the current system.246 By basing spouse and surviving
arrangements might be subject to certain restrictions.
Id.
241. See DIFFERENT APPROACHES, supra note 33, at 59 ("A voluntary private
disability insurance program, combined with insurers who might want to avoid the
problem of adverse selection, suggests that comprehensive disability protection would
be available to some only at a high price."); Kijakazi, supra note 17, at 23 ("The greater
the physical risk of the occupation and the less healthy the worker, the greater the

probability of not qualifying for coverage and the higher the premium for those who do

qualify.').

242. See Moore, supranote 3, app. For a discussion of how those benefits affect
redistribution within the current system, see Moore, supra note 3, § HI(D).
243. See DIFFERENT APPROACHES, supra note 33, at 59 ("Disability and
dependents' benefits are often not included in the discussion of individual accounts
because it is, in principle, possible to separate them from retirement benefits.").
244. For a discussion of changes the proposals make in the percentage of the
worker's benefit on which the spouse and surviving spouse benefits are based, see infra
notes 291-93 and accompanying text.
245. See Moore, supranote 3, app. (discussing how spouse and surviving spouse
benefits are calculated under the current system).
246. For a description of how the IA and PSA plan would provide first tier benefits
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spouse benefits on the smaller first tier benefit, partial privatization proposals
may reduce the total benefit spouse and surviving spouse beneficiaries receive.
How this reduction in spouse and surviving spouse benefits would likely affect
women247 depends on the degree to which they must rely on their husbands'
earnings for their social security benefits.248
Even though women's participation rate in the labor force has increased
dramatically since the inception of Social Security,249 the majority of women still
receive Social Security benefits based wholly or in part on their husband's
earning record 0° Of the 21 million women aged 62 or older who received
Social Security benefits in 1997, 2 l only 7.8 million, or 36.9%, received benefits
based solely on their own earnings record.212 In contrast, 7.7 million, or 36.4%,
of these women received benefits solely as wives or widows based on their
husband's earnings record,2" 3 and the remaining 5.6 million, or 26.7%, were
classified by the Social Security Administration as "dually entitled" and thus
received benefits based partially on their own earnings and partially on their

that are less than the total benefit available under the current system, see supra notes 20107 and accompanying text.
247. Between 98% and 99% of all spouse and surviving spouse benefits go to
women. See Moore supranote 3, § Ill(D)(1).
248. Any such reduction in benefits could be offset by providing women with a
protected interest in their spouses' second tier benefit, but not all partial privatization
proposals provide such protections.
249. See, e.g., GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY: ISSUES
INvOLvING BENEFIT EQUITY FOR WORKING WOMEN GAO/HEHS-96-55, at 26 (1996)
[hereinafter WORKING WOMEN] (noting that "[i]n 1940, only 28 percent of all women
were in the labor force, and less than 15 percent of married women were working. By
1993, almost 60 percent of all women were in the labor force and married women were
slightly more likely than other women to be working"); Marianne A. Ferber, Women 's
Employment andthe Social Security System, SOC. SEC. BULL., Fall 1993, at 33 (noting
that while less than 28% of women aged 16 or older participated in the labor force in
1940, by 1991 almost 60% of such women participated in the labor force); Hearing
before the Subcomm. on Retirement Income and Employment of the House Select Comm.
on Aging, How Will Today's Women Fare in Yesterday's Traditional Retirement
System?, 102d Cong. 33 (1992) (statement of William J. Hughes, Chairman, Subcomm.

on Retirement Income and Employment) (noting that "except for one glip right after the
war where it dropped between 1945 and 1950, until the present time, there is a continued
upward movement of women in the work force").
250. As discussed above, although Social Security's spouse and surviving spouse
benefits are facially gender-neutral, the benefits are awarded almost exclusively to
women.
251. 1998 ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT, supra note 238, at 201 tbl.5.A14.

(excluding special age-72 beneficiaries and adults receiving benefits because of
childhood disability).
252. 1998 ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT, supra note 238, at 201 tbl.5.A14.
253. 1998 ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT, supra note 238, at 201 tbl.5.A14.
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husband's earnings.2 If current trends continue,"' a substantial percentage of
women are expected to continue to rely on their husband's earnings records for
25 6
part or all of their Social Security benefits for the foreseeable future.
Of course, partial privatization's reduction in spouse and surviving spouse
benefits is unlikely to affect the benefits of women who do not rely on their
husband's earnings for their benefits and thus do not receive those benefits.257
Partial privatization, however, may reduce the total benefits of women who do
currently collect spouse or surviving spouse benefits.

Women who rely solely on their husband's earnings for their Social
Security benefits are likely to receive lower total benefits under a partially
privatized system than under the current system258 because their spouse and
surviving spouse benefits are based solely on a percentage of their working
spouse's lower first tier benefit. 9 Arguably, these women's decreased spouse

254. 1998 ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT, supra note 238, at 201 tbl.5.A14.
255. In 1960, about 57% of older women beneficiaries received benefits based
exclusively on their husband's earnings, while about 38% received benefits based solely
on their own earnings, and about 5% were dually entitled and thus received benefits
based 'in part on their own earnings and in part on their husbands' earnings. By 1988,
only about 40% of older women beneficiaries received benefits based solely on their
husband's earnings, while about 38% received benefits based solely on their own
earnings records, and 22% were dually entitled receiving benefits based partially on their
own earnings and partially on their husband's earnings. See Barbara A. Lingg, Women
BeneficiariesAged 62 or Older,1960-88, Soc. SEC. BULL., July 1990, at 2.
256. See I ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 21, at 143 ("The Social
Security Administration projects that roughly 60 percent of wives who retire in 2015 will
receive worker benefits and no spouse benefits. The remainder will either be dually
entitled (roughly 35 percent) or receive spouse benefits only (roughly 5 percent."));
Howard M. lams, Earningsof Couples: A CohortAnalysis, Soc. SEC. BULL., Fall 1993,
at 22 (stating that "[if] these earnings patterns continue through retirement age, the
majority of wives born in the 1930's and 1940's and two-fifths of those born in the
1950's can expect to receive spouse benefits, and, if widowed, most can expect to receive
widow benefits based on their husband's covered earnings.").
257. To the extent that these women have husbands who rely on their wive's
earnings for their benefits, the husband's total benefits may be decreased. However, 98%
to 99% of the spouse and surviving spouse beneficiaries are women. See supranote 247
and accompanying text
258. Indeed, the proponents of the Advisory Council's IA and PSA plans implicitly
recognize this fact by noting that almost all single-earner couples are projected to receive
higher internal rates of return under the Advisory Council's MB plan, which essentially
retains the current system, than under the IA or PSA plan. See I ADVISORY COUNCIL
REPORT, supra note 21, at 43-44. Only low-wage single-earner couples are expected to
receive equal rates of return under the PSA and MB plans. See I ADVISORY COUNCIL
REPORT, supra note 21, at 44; see also DIFFERENT APPROACHES, supra note 33, at 60
(noting that partial privatization proposals imply reduced spousal benefits).
259. The spouses of lower-wage workers might not receive spouse or surviving
spouse benefits under the Advisory Council's IA plan because the IA plan only reduces
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss2/1
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or surviving spouse benefits could be offset by their spouse's increased second
tier benefit. Not all partial privatization proposals, however, give women a
protected interest in their spouse's second tier benefit.
Current law generally requires that private pension benefits be paid out in
the form of ajoint-and-survivor annuity26° unless the spouse elects otherwise,26'
and a number of privatization proposals include a similar provision. For
example, the Advisory Council's IA plan requires that the worker's individual
account balance be annuitized upon retirement and "[a]s is the case with other
pension plans, a married worker would have a choice (with the consent of the
spouse) on whether a single or 'joint and survivor' annuity was chosen."262
Similarly, the National Commission on Retirement Policy recommends that
individuals be required "to annuitize that portion of their individual savings

account balances which, when added to their traditional Social Security benefit,

is necessary to provide an income comfortably above the poverty line," 263 and
that "the annuities . ..be similar to those required to be offered to
plan
to [ERISA]." 264

participants under qualified defined benefit plans subject
The Advisory Council's PSA plan, in contrast, does not require that a
worker's account balance be annuitized upon retirement.265 Surviving spouses

first tier benefits for middle- and high-wage earners.
260. See 29 U.S.C. § 1055 (1994). A joint-and-survivor annuity pays benefits for
the remainder of the lifetime of both the worker and the worker's beneficiary, in this
case, the worker's spouse.
261. Generally, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA")
requires that private pension benefits be paid out in the form of a joint and survivor

annuity. See 29 U.S.C. § 1055 (1994). For a critical analysis of the 1983 legislation
enacting this requirement, see Camilla E. Watson, Broken Promises Revisited: The
Window of VulnerabilityforSurvivingSpouses UnderERISA, 76 IOWA L. REV. 431, 47286 (1991).
262. I ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 21, at 28.
263. THE 21ST CENTURY RETIREMENT SECURITY PLAN, supra note 24, at 13.
264. THE 21ST CENTURY RETIREMENT SECURITY PLAN, supranote 24, at 13.

For
a similar recommendation, see Forman, supranote 107, at 1680-84 (recommending that
at a minimum couples be required to annuitize their account balances to the extent
necessary for their total benefits (including first tier benefits) to provide the equivalent
of an indexed annuity equal to 125% of the poverty level; also recommending that
spouses be entitled to information about their spouse's individual accounts, and that they
be required to give consent to significant withdrawals). The Committee for Economic
Development favors requiring workers to annuitize their individual account balances
upon retirement but does not specifically address spousal interests in those account
balances. See FIXING SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note 23, at 51. The Committee's plan
recommends that existing ERISA regulations be incorporated to the extent possible, see
FIXING SOCIAL SECURITY, supranote 23, at 51, however, it suggests that the Committee
might also endorse joint and survivor annuities as a default payout option.
265. I ADVISORY COUNCI REPORT, supra note 21, at 30. Moreover, the PSA plan

does not require that retired workers elect joint-and-survivor annuities if they elect to
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are "eligible" to inherit any balance in their deceased spouse's individual
account, 26 but they are not guaranteed any interest in that account. Instead,
"[t]he personal savings account would belong to the partner who earned it, and
the entitlement of the lower-earning spouse or survivor to a share would depend
upon the generosity of the higher-earning spouse or the divorce courts." '67 Thus,
women who rely solely on their husband's earning record for their Social
Security benefits are likely to receive lower spouse and surviving spouse benefits
under a partially privatized system and those decreased benefits may or may not
be offset by an interest in their spouse's second tier benefits, depending on the
terms of the particular partial privatization proposal and the generosity of their
spouse.
Like women who rely solely on their husband's earnings record for their
Social Security benefits, dually entitled women are also likely to receive smaller
spouse and surviving spouse benefits under a partially privatized system and
their reduced spouse and surviving spouse benefits may or may not be offset by
an interest in their spouse's second tier benefit. Unlike women who rely solely
on their husband's earnings record for their Social Security benefits, however,
dually entitled women under a partially privatized system are also entitled to a
second tier individual account benefit based solely on their own earnings
record.268 Depending on the size of their individual account, dually entitled
women could receive second tier benefits that more than make up for any
reduction in their spouse and surviving spouse benefits regardless of whether
they have any interest in their spouse's second tier benefit.269

With respect to a specific breakdown of effect, partial privatization's
reduction in spouse benefits may have a disproportionately adverse impact on
annuitize their second tier benefit upon retirement. Based upon current trends, it appears
unlikely that working spouses would voluntarily elect joint-and-survivor annuities unless
joint-and-survivor annuities were the default option as they currently are in employer
pensions. Cf Diamond, supranote 188, at 47 (noting that if "left on their own, many
workers tend to select single-life as opposed to joint-and-survivor annuities ... the
degree ofjoint-life annuitization is very sensitive to system design").
266. I ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supranote 21, at 32.
267. I ADVISORY COUNCIL

REPORT,

supra note 21, at 150.

268. When fully implemented, the Advisory Council's PSA plan would also
provide dually entitled beneficiaries who work more than 10 years with an increased first
tier benefit. See I ADviSoRY COUNCIL REPORT, supra not6 21, at 31 ("For individuals
who do not work a full career, half of the flat benefit [$410 in 1996 dollars] would be
earned with 10 years of covered earnings, with a 2-percent increment for each additional
year of work up to 25 years.").

269. In 1997, dually entitled wives received total benefits ranging from less than
$200 per month to more than $1,000 per month, with an average total benefit of $460 per
month. See 1998 ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT, supra note 238, at 232 tbls.5.G4,
5.G3. Dually entitled widowers received total benefits ranging from less than $200 per
month to more than $1,200 per month, with an average total benefit of $867 per month.
See 1998 ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT, supra note 241, at 232 tbls.5.G4, 5.G3.
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white women and the wives of higher-income workers because they are more
likely to collect those benefits than are black women or the wives of lowerincome workers.270 On the other hand, partial privatization's reduction in
survivor benefits may affect women of all races approximately equally because
they are equally likely to collect those benefits.271
Reducing spouse and surviving spouse benefits may very well represent
good public policy: the auxiiary benefit provisions are subject to criticism on
a number of grounds. 272 First, they create inequities in the treatment of dualearner couples vis-a-vis single-earner couples.273 Generally, the spouse and
surviving spouse benefit provisions result in single-earner couples receiving
higher combined monthly benefits in retirement than two-earner couples with
identical lifetime earnings (and all other relevant characteristics, such as age).274
In addition, the spouse and surviving spouse benefit provisions may be unfair to
secondary earners (usually women) because they limit the secondary earner to
the higher of their spouse/surviving spouse benefit or their benefit based on their
own earnings record.275 Thus, secondary earners may work and pay Social
Security taxes for years and yet receive no additional benefit for their
277
contributions. 276 Furthermore, this limitation may create work disincentives

270. See Moore, supra note 3, § III(D)(1).
271. See Moore, supra note 3, § III(D)(1).

272. For an excellent overview of the current system's treatment of women, see
Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Women, Fairness,and Social Security, 82
IOWA L. REV. 1209 (1997).
273. The auxiliary benefit provisions also create inequities in the treatment of

unmarried workers relative to married couples because unmarried workers are ineligible
for the auxiliary benefits. Cf Burke & McCouch, supranote 272, at 1230 n.1 19 (noting
that "in present value terms, a married couple's benefits may exceed those of an

unmarried individual by as much as 100%, based on identical payroll taxes").
274. For a more detailed explanation and illustrations of how single-earner couples
often receive larger benefits than dual-earner couples with identical lifetime earnings, see,
e.g., WORKING WOMEN, supra note 249, at 15-21; Burke & McCouch, supranote 272,
at 1209; Jonathan Barry Forman, PromotingFairnessin the Social Security Retirement
Program: PartialIntegration and a Creditfor Dual-EarnerCouples, 45 TAX LAW. 915,
933 (1992).
275. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(b)(1)(B), (c)(1)(B) (1994); 1998 SOCIAL SECURITY
EXPLAINED, supra note 102, 522.
276. WORKING WOMEN, supra note 249, at 21 ("It is sometimes argued that such

a limitation is unfair because it does not sufficiently reward a person for years of
contributions."); Forman, supra note 274, at 946 (describing the limitation as a "penalty

on secondary workers").
277. Interestingly, the number of secondary earners has steadily increased since the
inception of Social Security despite this apparent work disincentive. See, e.g., Lingg,
supra note 255, at 5 (noting that percentage of dually entitled older women beneficiaries
has increased from 5% in 1960 to 22% in 1988, while the percentage of older women
beneficiaries relying exclusively on their husband's earnings record for benefits has
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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for the secondary earner in a two-earner couple. 2 8 Finally, despite the fact that
the spouse and surviving spouse benefit provisions were designed to satisfy the
presumptive need of dependents,279 they actually tend to provide the greatest
benefit to those least in need-women who do not work and who are married to
high earners."'
Reducing spousal and survivor benefits, however, does not unequivocally
constitute good public policy. Reducing survivor benefits could put elderly
widows, who are already particularly vulnerable to poverty under our current
nrae risk of poverty.282
system, 2811at an increased

decreased from about 57% in 1960 to 40% in 1988 and the percentage of older women
beneficiaries receiving benefits based solely on their own earnings record has remained
steady at about 38%). Cf Anne L. Alstott, Tax Policy andFeminism: Competing Goals
and Institutional Choices, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 2001, 2018 (1996) (noting that "a tax
incentive does not necessarily affect actual behavior").
278. See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at
BehavioralGenderBiases in the Code, 40 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 983, 999 (1993) (stating that
auxiliary benefit provisions "undermine[] the incentive of the potentially second-earner

spouse to enter the work force").
279. See, e.g., FINAL REPORT OF THE [1937-38] ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL
SECURITY, reprintedin REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SECURITY OF 1935, at

175, 189 (50th Ann. ed. 1985) ("Payment of supplementary allowances to annuitants who
have wives over 65 will increase the average benefit in such a manner as to meet the
greatest social need with the minimum increase in cost."). See also Burke & McCouch,
supra note 272, at 1214-15 ("When derivative benefits were first introduced, they were
justified on grounds of social adequacy. A supplementary benefit for a retired worker's
dependent family members was considered necessary, in view of the relatively low level
of primary benefits during the early years of social security."); Forman, supra note 274,
at 935-36 (noting that auxiliary benefits help program provide socially adequate benefits
to all beneficiaries).
280. See, e.g., Burke & McCouch, supra note 272, at 1230 ("From the perspective
of social adequacy, the spousal benefit provisions also function poorly. Spousal benefits
are often inversely related to need, resulting in an upside-down subsidy to middle- and
high-wage married couples-a 'dubious redistributive achievement."') (quoting Richard
V. Burkhauser, Alternative Social Security Responses to the ChangingRole of Women
and Men, in CONTROLLING THE COST OF SOCIAL SECURITY 141, 146 (Colin D. Campbell

ed., 1984)); Madonna Harrington Meyer, Making Claims As Workers or Wives: The
DistributionofSocial Security Benefits, 61 AM. SOC. REv. 449,462 (1996) ("Neither can
the [auxiliary] benefits be justified as antipoverty efforts; those with the largest monthly
benefits are significantly more likely than those with meager benefits to receive
noncontributory benefits."). Cf Karen C. Holden, Spouse and Survivor Benefits:
DistributionamongAged Women, I RES. ON AGING 301, 310 (1979) (noting that "[w]hile
equally distributed among couples, spouse benefits, designed as an antipoverty measure,
fail to target those couples most in need of additional income").
281. The poverty of elderly widows may be more attributable to their lack of
income from other sources than to low Social Security benefits. See WORKING WOMEN,
supra note 249, at 57. The GAO noted:
Most widows already receive social security benefits based on their deceased
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss2/1
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Although over the last three decades, Social Security has dramatically
reduced the percentage of elderly who are poor,28 3 unmarried older women
remain disproportionately poor.284 For example, while only 4.4% of married
couples aged 65 or older had income that fell below the poverty line in 1996, the
income of 19.8% of unmarried women aged 65 or older fell below the poverty
line that year.28 5 Similarly, while only 8.4% of married couples aged 65 or older
had income that fell below 125% of the poverty line in 1996, the income of
32.3% of unmarried women aged 65 or older fell below 125% of the poverty line

husbands' work records and these benefits are indexed to offset the effects of
inflation, thus maintaining the benefits' purchasing power over time. Other
sources of income, such as private pensions and income from assets, are
rarely indexed and sometimes disappear upon the death of the spouse who
'owned' them.
WORKING WOMEN, supra note 249, at 57. For additional discussion of the reasons why
elderly unmarried women tend to be poor, see Lois SHAW ET AL., THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL

3-7 (1998).
282. Of course, as noted above, some commentators contend that the present
auxiliary benefit provisions are not a particularly effective anti-poverty program because
the women who are in the best position to benefit from the provisions-married women
who do not work and who are married to high wage-earners-are in the least need. See
supra text accompanying note 280. Interestingly, though, the empirical work of one
analyst shows that survivor benefits generally do a better job of targeting poor elderly
widows' poverty than spousal benefits do of targeting poor elderly couples. See Holden,
supra note 280, at 313 (noting that "[t]he [Supplemental Widow's Benefits] do appear
to target poor, once-married women, paying 79.4% of these benefits to the 63.6% of
women who would be poor with only retired worker benefits and other incomes").
283. See Moore, supra note 3, § II.
284. Although all unmarried women are at a disproportionately greater risk of
poverty in older age, this Section focuses only on widows because they are the group of
unmarried older women most affected by spouse and surviving spouse benefits. Older
women who have never married are by definition ineligible for benefits based on their
spouse's earnings record. In addition, while Social Security provides for spouse and
surviving spouse benefits for divorced older women, few divorced women receive such
benefits. See David A. Weaver, The Economic Well-Being of Social Security
Beneficiaries, with an Emphasis on Divorced Beneficiaries, 60 SOC. SEC. BULL., Fall
1997, at 3, 5 (1997) ("Most aged women with a marital status of divorced do not receive
divorced spouse benefits. This is partly because many divorced women have earnings
histories that entitle them to higher primary benefits."). The GAO found:
[M]ost divorced women do not qualify for divorced spouse benefits because
most marriages that end in divorce last less than 10 years, the minimum
marriage duration needed to qualify for such benefits. In addition, many
divorced women who were married at least 10 years do not receive divorced
spouse benefits because they either subsequently remarry or have retired
worker benefits that exceed their benefit as a divorced spouse.
WORKING WOMEN, supra note 249, at 36.
SECURITY REFORM ON WOMEN

285. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES., supra note 93, at 125 tbl.VIII.1.
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that year.28 6 Indeed, unmarried women constitute more than 70% of the poor
elderly households even though they only represent 45% of all elderly
households." 7 Moreover almost two-thirds of all older women living in poverty
are widows,288 and "longitudinal data show that the death of a husband markedly
'28 9
increases the likelihood of poverty.
A partially privatized system could reduce the risk of poverty for elderly
widows by increasing surviving spouse benefits. 290 In fact, some, but not all,
partial privatization proposals do so. For example, the Advisory Council's IA
plan would shift benefits from spouses to surviving spouses by gradually
reducing the spouse benefit to thirty-three percent of the worker's benefit and
increasing the surviving spouse benefit to the highest of(l) his or her own basic
benefit, (2) the deceased spouse's basic benefit, or (3) seventy-five percent of the
couple's combined basic benefits.29 The Advisory Council's PSA plan would
retain the spouse benefit at fifty percent of the worker's benefit but gradually
increase the surviving spouse benefit to seventy-five percent of the couple's first
tier benefit.2 92 The Council on Economic Development, in contrast, recommends
gradually reducing the spouse benefit to thirty-three percent of the worker's
benefit while retaining
the surviving spouse benefit at one hundred percent of the
293
worker's benefit.
A partially privatized system could also reduce the risk of poverty to elderly
widows by requiring that, absent spousal consent, a married worker's individual
account benefit be paid out in the form of a joint-and-survivor annuity upon the
worker's retirement. Such a requirement would ensure that a surviving spouse
has a protected interest in her working spouse's benefit that could not be spent
prior to the working spouse's death or left to another beneficiary upon the
working spouse's death. Some of the proposals, such as the Advisory Council's
IA plan and the National Commission on Retirement Policy's proposal,
contemplate such a requirement. Others, in contrast, like the Advisory Council's
PSA plan, impose no such restrictions.

286. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 93, at 125 tbl.VIII.I.
287. WOMEN'S RETIREMENT INCOME, supra note 64, at 3.

288. See Steven H. Sandell & Howard M. Iams, Reducing Women's Poverty By
Shifting SocialSecurity Benefitsfrom Retired Couples to Widows, 16 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS
& MGMT. 279, 297 (1997).
289. Id. at 281.
290. Id. (analyzing three proposals to reduce couples' benefit income and increase
survivors' benefits by an actuarially fair amount to reduce poverty of elderly widows).
291. I ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 2 1, at 29.
292. I ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 21, at 32.
293. FIXING SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note 23, at 17.
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2. Dependent Child Benefits
Most proposals to partially privatize Social Security devote little attention
to dependent benefits. For example, neither the proponents of the Advisory

Council's IA plan nor the proponents of the Advisory Council's PSA plan even
mention dependent child benefits in their overview of the "important specific
Similarly, the Committee for Economic
provisions" of their plans. 9
Development never295refers to dependent child benefits in its summary of policy
recommendations.
In all likelihood, partial privatization would reduce dependent child
benefits. To the extent that partial privatization proposals retain dependent child
benefits, they would likely base those benefits on a percentage of the working
parent's first tier benefit. Since first tier benefits under a partially privatized
system are generally lower than total benefits under the current system,296
dependent child benefits are likely to be lower under a partially privatized
system than under the current system. Moreover, unlike spouses,

297

dependent

children are unlikely to have a guaranteed interest in their parent's second tier
benefit or have any of their own earnings on which they can rely for their own
second tier benefits. Thus, partial privatization is likely to result in dependent
children receiving decreased benefits.
Since nonwhites tend to benefit disproportionately from Social Security's
dependent child benefits, 298 it appears that partial privatization's reduction in
dependent child benefits would likely have a disproportionately adverse impact
on this at-risk group.

3. Conclusion
In sum, partial privatization of Social Security is likely to lead to reduced
spouse and surviving spouse benefits. For women who rely solely on their
husband's earnings record for their Social Security benefits, the reduction in
spouse and surviving spouse benefits would likely result in their receiving lower
total benefits, although their reduced spouse and surviving spouse benefits might

be offset by an interest in their husband's second tier benefit. Dually-entitled
women would likely also receive reduced spouse and surviving spouse benefits
that might or might not be offset by an interest in their husbands' second tier
benefit. Unlike women who rely solely on their husbands' earning record,

294. See I ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 21, at 28-33.
295. See FIXING SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note 23, at 16-18.
296. For a description of how the IA and PSA plans would provide first tier
benefits that are less than the total benefit available under the current system, see supra
notes 201-05 and accompanying text.

297. See supraPart III(E)(1).
298. See Moore, supranote 3, § III(D)(2).
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however, dually entitled women would also be entitled to a second tier benefit
based on their own earnings record. Depending on the size of that second tier
individual account benefit, it might or might not offset any reduction in spouse
or surviving spouse benefits. Since white women are more likely to collect
spouse benefits than are black women, and the wives of higher-income workers
are more likely to collect spouse and survivor benefits than are the wives of
lower-income workers, partial privatization's reduction in spouse benefits may
have a disproportionately adverse impact on white women and the wives of
higher-income workers. In contrast, since women of all races appear to be
equally likely to collect surviving spouse benefits, partial privatization's
reduction in survivor benefits would likely affect women of all races
approximately equally.
Reducing spouse and surviving spouse benefits may represent good public
policy for a variety of reasons. On the other hand, reducing surviving spouse
benefits could subject elderly widows to an increased risk of poverty. Partial
privatization could reduce this risk by increasing surviving spouse benefits and
by requiring that absent spousal consent, second tier individual account benefits,
be converted to a joint-and-survivor annuity upon the worker's retirement.
Some, but not all, partial privatization proposals provide these protections.
Although partial privatization proposals typically devote little attention to
dependent child benefits, it appears that most proposals would reduce these
benefits. Since nonwhites tend to disproportionately benefit from Social
Security's dependent child benefits, a reduction in these benefits would likely
have a disproportionately adverse impact on nonwhites.
IV. CONCLUSION
Determining how partial privatization would likely affect the benefits of
any particular worker or group of workers is no easy task. The current Social
Security system is extraordinarily complex and partially privatizing the system
would create additional intricacies. Despite these complexities, it appears that

on the whole partial privatization would likely have adisproportionately adverse
impact on the benefits of women, minorities, and lower-income workers. Since
these groups are already at a heightened risk of poverty in old-age, partial
privatization of Social Security does not appear to be a wise idea.
Of course, this is not to suggest that other social security reform proposals
may not also have a disproportionately adverse effect on at-risk beneficiaries.
To illustrate, the General Accounting Office has found that racial minorities are
particularly likely to be adversely affected by increases in the retirement age.299

299. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM: IMPLICATIONS OF
RAISING THE RETIREMENT AGE GAO/HEHS-99-112, at 29 (1999); see also Julia Lynn

Coronado et al., DistributionalImpacts of Proposed Changes to the Social Security
System, 13 TAx POL'Y &ECON. 149, 172-78 (1999) (finding that eliminating the drop-out

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss2/1

62

Moore: Moore: Partial Privatization of Social Security:

2000]

EFFECTOFPARTIAL PRIVATIZA TION

As this Author has explained elsewhere, partial privatization of Social Security
does not appear to be a wise idea for additional reasons.3°°
Nevertheless, if policymakers insist on partial privatization of Social
Security, they should take care to alleviate the adverse effects partial
privatization may have on the at-risk groups to the extent possible. First, if
Social Security is partially privatized, all workers can and should be provided
with investment education. Although investment education would not eliminate
all of the disadvantages the at-risk groups face, it would help level the playing
field. Second, partial privatization should require that second tier benefits be
annuitized upon retirement. Admittedly, mandatory annuitization would raise
difficult timing issues and difficult questions regarding the proper life table to be
used that could result in some of the at-risk groups receiving lower expected

lifetime benefits because of their lower life expectancies. Nevertheless,
annuitization should be required to protect the at-risk groups from the risk of
outliving their second tier benefit. After all, the purpose of Social Security is to

provide workers with retirement income, not an estate to be distributed at
death.3"' Finally, partial privatization should require that, absent spousal
consent, the second tier benefit of married workers be paid out in the form of a
joint-and-survivor annuity to the worker and the worker's spouse. Although
joint-and-survivor annuities would not eliminate all risk of poverty for elderly
widows, they would be a step in the right direction.

years, increasing the retirement age, increasing the social security tax rate, and decreasing
the benefit level across the board would all constitute regressive changes to the current
system); Schieber, supra note 3, at 165 ("Social Security reform proposals that cut
benefits across the board will have a disproportionately large effect on the retirement
consumption potential of the people at the bottom end of the economic ladder, while the
people at the upper end of the ladder will hardly notice a difference.").
300. See Moore, supranote 12, at 153-68 (contending that partial privatization of
Social Security is misguided because (1) it does not guarantee workers better returns, (2)
it imposes transition costs, (3) it promotes misguided paternalism, and (4) it misconceives
the role Social Security should play in our national retirement system).
301. Cf. Richard L. Kaplan, Retirement Funding and the Curious Evolution of
IndividualRetirement Accounts, 7 ELDER L.J. 283, 303-10 (1999) (contending that the
IRC § 4974(a) required distribution regime should be extended to Roth IRAs to ensure
that they are used for their intended retirement purposes and not to build wealth to pass
on to future generations).
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